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Historians may remember the 1970s as the decade in which law-
makers first recognized the limits of regulation as an instrument for
the promotion of social and economic policies. In a major address on
March 25, 1979, President Carter declared that his administration
would strive "to reduce, to rationalize and to streamline the regulatory
burden throughout American life."'. Efforts toward that end in the
95th Congress prompted the partial deregulation of airlines2 and
natural gas producers.3 This year, the President has exercised his uni-
lateral authority to deregulate domestic crude oil prices, 4 and Congress
is considering proposals to reduce or eliminate federal regulation of
railroads," the trucking industry,0 and certain segments of the tele-
communications industry.
7
If deregulation is an idea whose time has come, Congress should not
overlook the electric-power industry. The Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission (FERC)8 and its state counterparts together administer a
comprehensive regulatory scheme that includes control over market
entry, rate schedules, location of facilities, and standards of service.
This pervasive market intervention may be justified, in part, by the
j This essay was selected for publication from among a number submitted by non-
editor members of the Yale Law School third-year class.
0 The author gratefully acknowledges the valuable assistance and comments of Daniel
I. Davidson, James F. Fairman, Paul W. MacAvoy, Phillip Nicholson, and Gordon T.C.
Taylor.
1. N.Y. Times, Mar. 26, 1979, at 1, col. 1.
2. Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-504, 92 Stat. 1705 (1978).
3. Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-621, 92 Stat. 3350 (1978).
4. See Wash. Post, Apr. 6, 1979, § A, at 1, col. 3.
5. See id., Mar. 8, 1979, § F, at 4, col. 2.
6. See S.710, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979) (would repeal antitrust exemption that enables
trucking companies to set freight tariffs collectively).
7. See H.R. 3333, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979) (would deregulate radio broadcasting
immediately, television broadcasting in 10 years, abolish Federal Communications Com-
mission and Fairness Doctrine).
8. Until 1977 federal authority to regulate electric utilities was vested primarily, but
not exclusively, in the Federal Power Commission (FPC). The Department of Energy
Organization Act, Pub. L. No. 95-91, 91 Stat. 565 (1977), abolished the FPC and transferred
most of its responsibilities to the newly created FERC, effective October 1, 1977.
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fact that the retail distribution of electric power is a natural monop-
oly.9 But the existing regulatory regime functions as if electric utilities
performed only one service, and as if the market for that service were a
natural monopoly. In fact, the structure of the industry is not that
simple.
All but a handful of the 100 largest utilities are vertically integrated
suppliers. They perform three distinct services: the production, trans-
mission, and distribution of electricity.1 0 Although transmission and
distribution are natural monopolies within the relevant geographic
markets,:" production is not. The more densely populated regions of
the country consume more electricity than could be produced by any
one generafing plant.12 These regions could support extensive com-
petition among bulk-power suppliers, if the plants were under separate
ownership and each had equal access to local distribution systems. 13
9. A natural monopoly is a business characterized by decreasing unit costs as volume
increases, throughout the entire range of probable output levels. 2 A. KAHN, THE
ECONOMICS OF REGULATION 119 (1971). Competition in a natural monopoly market is in-
efficient because one supplier can meet the demand more economically than two or more
firms that divide the market. Id. at 125. The retail distribution of electricity in any one
community is a natural monopoly because substantial economies of scale result from
increasing the density of the load. "The more customers there are per square mile the
fewer miles of distribution lines that are needed per customer." Florida Power & Light
Co., Nos. ER78-19 (Phase 1) & ER78-81, at 24 (FERC 1978) (statement of Dr. Gordon
T.C. Taylor, staff economist, FERC) [hereinafter cited as Taylor with page citations to
prepared statement].
10. Production or generation is the act of transforming heat, falling water, or other
forms of energy into electricity. Transmission has been defined as "the transportation of
electrical energy at high voltage from generating plants to bulk delivery points." 1 FDERAL
POWER COMMIssION, NATIONAL POWER SURVEY 12 (1964) [part one hereinafter cited as
1964 POWER SURVEY]. Distribution entails the delivery of power, at much lower voltage,
from a substation to retail customers. The generation and transmission stages together
constitute the bulk-power supply system.
11. The cheapest way to transmit a given volume of electricity between two points is to
carry the entire load on one line. Doubling the voltage of a transmission line increases
the carrying capacity by the square of the change in voltage. Since the cost of the line
increases roughly in direct proportion to the change in voltage, the cost per unit of
carrying capacity falls as design voltage is increased. Taylor, supra note 9, at 24. More-
over, increasing the capacity of a line reduces the environmental and aesthetic impact,
per unit of electricity transmitted. Id. at 25. For these reasons utilities transmitting power
along the same corridor should share the cost of a single line, rather than build two or
more lines of lower voltage. Id.
12. Weiss, Antitrust in the Electric Power Industry, in PROMOTING COMPETITION IN
REGULATED MARKETS 136 (A. Phillips ed. 1975).
13. Id. The number of producers who could compete to sell bulk power to any one
distributor depends, to a considerable extent, on the cost of transmission. In the last
several decades, utilities have installed thousands of miles of high-voltage transmission
lines. See Nagel, The National Grid: A Misconception, PUB. UTIL. FORT., Jan. 6, 1972, at
35 figure 4. These lines have reduced the cost of long-distance transmission, thereby ex-
panding the size of bulk-power sales markets. Weiss, supra note 12, at 136. During the
Arab oil embargo petroleum-dependent New England utilities saved fuel by purchasing
electricity from coal-fired plants in the midwestern states. See Richmond Power & Light
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The primary policy objection to competition at the production stage
is that the ownership by one firm of many generating plants, and
transmission lines connecting them, facilitates the capture of scale
economies associated with the size of the bulk-power supply system.
By coordinating the operation of two or more generating plants, 14 in
ways discussed below, utilities can produce power more efficiently than
if each plant operates in isolation. The hard question is whether the
need for coordination among generating plants precludes competition
among utilities in the production and distribution of electricity.
The answer, if based upon experience to date, would be that the
goals of coordination and competition are mutually exclusive. Early in
the 1960s the Federal Power Commission (FPC) recognized the benefits
of coordination and became an enthusiastic booster of voluntary power
pooling.'5 The industry responded by organizing a number of large
power pools and less formal coordinating groups"0 that have contrib-
uted substantially to the efficiency of the bulk-power supply. Un-
fortunately, these efficiency gains have often occurred at the expense of
competition. Many pooling agreements limit membership to a handful
of the largest utilities in the region 17Restrictions on membership deny
v. FERC, 574 F.2d 610, 613 (D.C. Cir. 1978). Since 1978 the Consolidated Edison
Company of New York has been importing economical hydropower from Quebec on a
new 155-mile, 765,000-volt line. N.Y. Times, Feb. 18, 1979, § 1, at 56, col. 1.
14. The FPC defined coordination as "joint planning and operation of bulk power
facilities by two or more electric systems for improved reliability and increased effi-
ciency which would not be attainable if each system acted independently." I FEDERAL
POWER COMMISSION, THE 1970 NATIONAL POWER SURVEY 17-1 (1971) [hereinafter cited as
1970 POWER SURVEY). The term embraces a large number of cooperative arrangements that
enable utilities of suboptimal size to gain the efficiency benefits of large-scale operation,
while maintaining their corporate autonomy.
15. A power pool is a group of physically interconnected utilities that have made a
contractual commitment to practice certain types of coordination. Coordination may im-
pose substantial burdens on participating firms. The pooling agreement sets out in
writing the scope of the transaction and the obligations of each party. Since at least 1964
the FPC has encouraged utilities to organize power pools. See, e.g., 1964 POWER SURVEY,
supra note 10, at 3.
16. In their seminal study of the FPC, Breyer and MacAvoy included an inventory, by
now somewhat obsolete, of power pools that were operating in 1970. See S. BREYER & P.
MAcAvoY, ENERGY REGULATION BY THE FEDERAL POWER COMMISSION 100-04 (1974).
Recognizing the need for current information on the extent of coordination among
utilities, Congress in 1978 ordered the FERC to study the opportunities for energy con-
servation, improved efficiency, and increased reliability through pooling. The report is
due in May 1980. Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-617,
§ 205(b), 92 Stat. 3117 (1978) (codified at 16 U.S.C.A. § 824a-l(b) (West Supp. 1979)).
17. See Fairman &- Scott, Transmission, Power Pools, and Competition in the Electric
Utility Industry, 28 HASTINGS L.J. 1159, 1195 (1977). A coalition of small utilities excluded
from the Mid-Continent Area Power Pool (MAPP) recently appealed a decision by the
FERC that the MAPP Agreement's restrictive membership provisions do not violate the
antitrust laws or the Federal Power Act. Mid-Continent Area Power Pool Agreement,
[1977] UTIL. L. REP. (CCH) , 11,958 (FPC 1977), appeal docketed sub nom. Alexandria
Bd. of Pub. Works v. FERC, No. 77-1916 (D.C. Cir. Oct. 7, 1977).
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small utilities access to scale economies. As a result, both competition
and efficiency suffer. Small utilities competing against much larger
firms struggle to survive,' 8 while both factions forego opportunities to
reduce operating costs through coordination.
This essay proposes a scheme of reorganization for the electric-power
industry that would minimize the conflict between coordination and
competition. It argues that CongTess should divide the nation, for
purposes of electric-power production, into regional dispatching corpo-
rations (RDCs), each of which would acquire the entire high-voltage
grid within its jurisdiction. RDCs would lease production capacity from
private contractors, much as a tenant leases office space. An RDC
would dispatch all of the generating equipment in its region, and
would sell bulk power to local distributors. Power-plant owners would
compete to lease capacity to the RDCs for a limited term of years. Bid-
ding among producers would enable the RDCs to meet their capacity
requirements at the lowest possible cost, while stimulating the develop-
ment of new generating technologies. The plan would also promote
competition at the distribution stage, by insuring that all distributors
enjoy equal access to the exclusive source of bulk power in their region.
Assigning enough load to each RDC so that it managed a bulk-power
supply system of technologically optimal size would achieve the best
of both worlds: maximum feasible efficiency in a competitive environ-
ment.
I. The Coordination Problem
A. Economies of Scale in Bulk-Power Supply
Several observers have described in detail the economies of scale that
can be achieved by the interconnection and coordinated operation of
two or more generating plants.10 The types of coordination most fre-
quently employed include reserve sharing, economy exchange, diversity
exchange, central economic dispatch, and coordinated system planning.
Electric utilities must maintain generating capacity in reserve to
cover contingencies such as equipment failure, scheduled maintenance
shutdowns, and unexpected peak-power demands. At minimum, a
18. See note 65 infra.
19. See, e.g., Public Utility Rate Proposals of President Carter's Energy Program:
Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Energy Conservation and Regulation of the Senate
Comm. on Energy and Natural Resources, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 2, at 396-403 (1977)
(statement of Abraham Gerber and Joe D. Pace) [hereinafter cited as Public Utility Hear-
ings]; S. BREYER & P. MAcAvoY, supra note 16, at 91-93; Meeks, Concentration in the
Electric Power Industry: The Impact of Antitrust Policy, 72 COLUM. L. REv. 64, 101-07
(1972).
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utility must maintain sufficient reserves to meet some target level of
reliability-e.g., one generating outage in ten years. 20 Reserve capacity
may not be needed very often, but its capital cost is a major item in
the rate base of most utilities. -1 Interconnection of generating plants
reduces the cost of meeting reserve requirements. A utility that operates
two generators during the period of peak demand must maintain a
third unit of equal size on line and ready to pick up load immediately,
should a primary generator fail. The reserve unit could cover for five
plants rather than two, with only a slight loss of reliability.2 2 The
greater the number of interconnected plants, the lower the percentage
of total capacity that must be maintained in reserve to meet a given
standard of reliability.
An economy exchange exploits the difference in marginal production
cost between two generating units. One plant may be cheaper to run
than the other, due to such factors as the price of fuel. 23 If one util-
ity owns both plants, the more economical unit will obviously be
dispatched first. If the two plants belong to different utilities, the
20. Most utilities aim for a high standard of reliability, in part because the conse-
quences of a power outage are severe:
Inability to meet customer demands is probably the primary fear of all systems'
executives since repeated failure to do so is perhaps the most likely ground for
revocation of a company's franchise, upon which its very existence depends. Thus,
unlike most business enterprises, the electric power system must equate supply with
demand on an instantaneous basis. In view of the modem reliance upon electricity,
any sustained failure to do so would be a social and economic catastrophe.
Meeks, supra note 19, at 69 (footnotes omitted).
21. American utilities plan their systems on the assumption that only one generating
outage in 10 years is acceptable. National Energy Act: Hearings Before the Subcomm.
on Energy and Power of the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 95th
Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 3, at 658 (1977) (statement of Dr. Alvin Kaufman, Congressional
Research Service) [hereinafter cited as National Energy Act Hearings]. To meet this
reliability standard, large systems maintain a production capacity about 20% larger than
the amount needed to meet annual peak demand. Id. Due to the capital-intensive nature
of the electric-power industry, consumers pay a premium for this high level of reliability.
A study prepared in 1975 for the New York interconnected system assessed the cost of
meeting the "one day in 10 years" standard at $1.6 billion. Id. at 651.
22. If the reserve unit is equal in capacity to the largest plant in use, and the reserve
unit is maintained on instant call, there can be no loss of load unless two generating
plants fail simultaneously. Assigning one reserve unit to cover for five operating plants
rather than two increases the risk of an outage by the increased probability of a simul-
taneous failure by two or more plants. In return for this modest reduction in reliability,
the reserve margin for the entire system would be reduced from 50 to 20% of peak
capacity-a substantial saving for the consumer. For a more realistic and slightly more
complicated hypothetical, see Gainesville Utils. Dep't v. Florida Power Corp., 402 U.S. 515,
519 n.3 (1971).
23. For example, the fuel used to produce one kilowatt-hour (kWh) of electricity by
coal-fired generating plants in the Midwest costs less than half as much, in 1977, as the
oil needed to produce a k*Vh in New England. National Energy Act Hearings, supra
note 21, pt. 3, at 549 (statement of George Spiegel). The cost differential has undoubtedly
increased since then.
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parties may enter into an economy energy exchange, whereby the firm
with the lower-cost unit sells power to the other utility at a price some-
where between its incremental generating cost and the cost at which
the purchaser could produce the power. The larger the number of in-
terconnected plants, the more efficiently the generating resources of
the pool can be utilized.
2 4
Central economic dispatch is a sophisticated application of this prin-
ciple. In a centrally dispatched power pool the participating utilities
delegate operating control over their generating plants to a computer
programmed with incremental production-cost data for 'each plant
in the pool. When demand increases the computer meets load with the
most economical generator that still has excess capacity. As demand falls
the least economical unit is shut down first. In this way central dispatch
minimizes the total operating cost of all the units in the pool.2 5
A diversity exchange exploits differences in the time at which two
or more utilities encounter peak demand. Since electricity cannot be
stored, the generating capacity of the utility must be sufficient to meet
annual peak demand, a condition that may occur only once a year. At
all other times, the firm has excess capacity. Different utilities ex-
perience peak demand during different parts of the day or year. Firms
that experience nonsimultaneous peaks can enter into a diversity ex-
change, whereby the utility with idle generators sells power to its
neighbor during the latter's peak period. Normally the arrangement is
reciprocal.2 6 The transaction enables both firms to meet their peak
24. Economy energy transactions have been employed since the 1973 OPEC embargo
to reduce the demand for imported petroleum. A 1976 study found that by 1980, 125,000
barrels of oil per day could be saved by transmitting coal-based electricity from mid-
western generators to east coast utilities. Public Utility Hearings, supra note 19, pt. 3, at
159 (statement of David J. Bardin, Deputy Administrator, Federal Energy Administration
(FEA)) (citing National Electric Reliability Council, A Study of Interregional Energy
Transfers for the Year 1980 (May 1976)).
25. Id. The Pennsylvania-Jersey-Maryland Interconnection, one of the nation's most
sophisticated power pools, estimated that central dispatching saved $157 million in 1975
and 17 million barrels of oil in 1974. Id.
26. Washington state utilities, for instance, encounter peak demand in the winter,
while southern California firms experience peak demand during the air conditioning
season. West coast utilities in collaboration with the federal government built an extra-
high-voltage transmission line linking Los Angeles with hydropower facilities on the
Columbia River to facilitate seasonal capacity exchanges between the regions. Foote,
Larsen & Maddox, Bonneville Power Administration: Northwest Power Broker, 6 ENVT'L
L. 831, 838 (1976). Daily load diversity between firms results, in part, from time-zone
differentials. In 1977, an imaginative entrepreneur approached various federal officials
with a proposal to build a 10,000-mile, high-voltage line from Japan to London, across
the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans, by means of submarine cable. The line would enable
American utilities to exchange peaking capacity with Japanese and British counterparts.
Westinghouse Corporation expressed interest in the idea. See Public Utility Hearings,
supra note 19, pt. 3, at 216-32.
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period requirements with less installed production capacity than would
otherwise be necessary. Given the enormous capital cost of a new
generating plant,2 7 customers stand to benefit from any arrangement
that reduces the required investment without sacrificing reliability.
The larger the geographic area served by an interconnected supply
system, the more opportunity there will be for the exchange of peaking
power.
System size also influences investment decisions. Generally speaking,
utilities purchase the largest generating units they can use, for there
are economies of scale in generator size. 28 In order to capture these
economies the firm may build a plant too large for its immediate needs,
with the expectation that future growth in demand will absorb the
new capacity.29 The growth rate sets a ceiling on the size of new plants.
If a plant operates for too long at less than full capacity, the capital
charges on an idle investment exceed the benefits from building a
larger plant. This tradeoff favors a large system, for the more customers
served by one system, the more rapidly it can absorb the capacity from
a new generating unit. Utilities recognize this principle by pooling
their resources to build and jointly own plants of a larger scale than
any one firm could afford.
30
Most of the nation's generating plants are already interconnected
with other plants operating in the same region.31 Within each of the
27. The electric-power industry is the most capital-intensive industry in the United
States. Electric utilities must invest $4.18 for every dollar of sales. By comparison railroads
spend $2.54, steel companies $.86, and the automobile industry only $.57. Investment by
utilities in property, plant, and equipment represented 16.5% of all U.S. business invest-
ment in 1974. P. McCracken, W. Rosenberg & G. Decker, Energy Industrial Center Study
(June 1975) (unpublished report prepared for the Office of Energy R & D Policy, National
Science Foundation), reprinted in Public Utility Hearings, supra note 19, pt. 2, at 218.
In 1977 generating plants accounted for 70% of construction expenditures by private
utilities. EDISON ELECTRIC INSTITUTE, STATISTICAL YEARBOOK OF THE ELECTRIC UTILITY IN-
DUSTRY FOR 1977, at 59 (1978).
28. See S. BREYER & P. MAcAvoy, supra note 16, at 93 ("mTfhe most efficient way to
make electricity usually is to install the largest generator that technology permits.
29. L. WEiss, CASE STUDIES IN AMERICAN INDUSTRY 95 (2d ed. 1971).
30. Seventy-eight large generating units scheduled to come on line between 1977 and
1986 will be jointly owned by two or more utilities. ELECTRICAL WORLD, Mar. 15, 1978, at
93-94. Another common strategy is for utilities to take turns building new plants. Each
participant adds new capacity in increments large enough to meet the needs of the entire
group, and sells power to the other firms until its customers absorb the entire capacity of
the new unit. See Public Utility Hearings, supra note 19, pt. 2, at 402-03 (statement of
Abraham Gerber and Joe D. Pace).
31. In the wake of the 1965 Northeast power failure the industry voluntarily organized
regional councils to promote reliability through coordinated system planning. See 1970
POWER SURVEY, supra note 14, at 17-14. Today there are nine regional reliability councils,
the membership of which includes almost all of the electric-power systems in the lower 48
states and several Canadian provinces. National Energy Act Hearings, supra note 21, pt.
3, at 695 (statement of Walter J. Matthews, President, National Electric Reliability
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nine regional reliability councils there is enough generating capacity
to form power pools of close to the optimal size for the full realization
of coordination economies.3 2 But mere physical interconnection does
not require firms to take advantage of the opportunities presented.
Several observers have noted that the industry is not exploiting all
feasible coordination opportunities. 33 Centrally dispatched pools con-
trol only about one-third of the nation's generating capacity, 34 and
many of these pools are not large enough to take full advantage of
scale economies. 35 The modest progress toward closer coordination
reported in the last five years does not warrant substantial revision of
the conclusions reached by Breyer and MacAvoy in 1974: "The evi-
dence .. .suggests that there should be considerably more coordina-
tion at this time than now exists." 30
B. Obstacles to Coordination
Despite the economies of scale in system size, many utilities have
concluded that the burdens of membership in a tightly coordinated
power pool outweigh the benefits. The impediments to coordination
include: (1) conflicts of interest among participating utilities; (2) dis-
Council). Most of the bulk-power systems within each reliability council are intercon-
nected. East of the Continental Divide the network of interconnections reaches across
reliability council "boundaries":
The electric power supply systems in the eastern, southern and midwestern regions
of the United States normally operate together in a synchronous manner to form a
series of large interconnected electric power grids. Geographically, these intercon-
nected systems extend from Maine to Florida and inland as far as Oklahoma, Nebraska
and the Dakotas and include most power facilities in seven of the nine electric reli-
ability councils. The far western states tend to operate as a separate series of power
grids with weaker ties to the East. The interconnected systems in most of Texas
operate as an electrically isolated power grid.
New England Power Pool Participants (Coal-By-Wire), 52 F.P.C. 410, 420 (1974), aff'd
sub nom. Richmond Power & Light v. FERC, 574 F.2d 610 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
32. Studies have estimated that most coordination savings could be realized by systems
in the 30-50,000-megawatt (MW) range. See S. BREYER & P. MAcAvoY, sulpra note 16, at
106-07. By the end of 1976, utilities in all but one of the nine regional reliability councils
had an aggreate installed capacity in excess of 30,000 MW. NATIONAL ELECTRIC RELIABILITY
COUNCIL, 7TH ANNUAL REVIEV OF OVERALL RELIABILITY AND ADEQUACY OF THE NORTH
AMERICAN BULK POWER SYSTEMS (1977), reprinted in Public Utility Hearings, supra note 19,
pt. 2, at 346.
33. See, e.g., Public Utility Hearings, supra note 19, pt. 3, at 151 (statement of David
J. Bardin, Deputy Administrator, FEA); FEDERAL ENERGY ADMINISTRATION, STRUCTURAL RE-
FORM IN THE ELECTRIC POWER INDUSTRY 30 (1976) [hereinafter cited as STRUCTURAL RE-
FORM]; 2 A. KAHN, supra note 9, at 76.
34. FEDERAL POWER COMMISSION, FACTORS AFFECTING THE ELECTRIC POWER SUPPLY 1980.
85: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS 28 (1976).
35. In December 1976 the FPC published a report that included an inventory of cen-
trally dispatched power pools. Only one of the entities on the FPC list controlled as
much as 30,000 MW of generating capacity. One system on the list had a net capability
of 236 MW. See id.
36. S. BREYER & P. MAcAvoY, supra note 16, at 97 (emphasis in original).
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incentives built into the regulatory regime; and (3) intentional efforts
by vertically integrated firms to deny potential retail competitors ac-
cess to the economies of scale.
Conflicts of interest arise because a coordination project rarely bene-
fits all participating utilities equally. 37 Parties to the venture often
disagree over how the costs should be apportioned.38 Yet utility man-
agers are reluctant to endow a central committee with the power to
impose financial burdens on dissenting members. In some pools pro-
posed actions require the unanimous consent of every participant. 39
Coordinating groups have broken up over the inability of members to
reach a consensus on basic decisions.40 When that occurs, the utilities
and their customers lose the efficiency benefits that could have resulted
from collective action.41
37. The problem of differential benefits arises whenever a project involves utilities of
greatly differing size. Small firms stand to gain more from coordination than large ones,
because the small utility in isolation is further from the most efficient operating size. Id.
at 109.
38. See, e.g., Gainesville Utils. Dep't v. Florida Power Corp., 402 U.S. 515 (1971). The
small municipal utility of Gainesville, Florida sought to interconnect its grid with that of
the much larger Florida Power Corporation, in order to share reserves. The arrangement
would have enabled Gainesville to postpone construction of a generating plant. Id. at 520.
However, the small reserve capacity of the municipal system had little value to Florida
Power. The FPC required Gainesville to pay the entire capital cost of the interconnec-
tion, to maintain the same reserve margin as Florida Power (15% of peak load), and to
compensate the investor-owned system for actual energy transfers across the interconnec-
tion. Id. at 522. But the Commission denied Florida Power permission to charge an annual
fee, over and above any costs incurred, that the large firm attempted to justify in terms
of the value of the service to Gainesville. Id. at 522-23. On this point Florida Power
appealed to the Supreme Court, which affirmed the decision of the Commission. Id. at
517. Gainesville had recourse to the FPC because the Commission has authority to order
the interconnection of transmission facilities; it can also require one utility to sell energy
to another and can regulate the rates charged for these services. 16 U.S.C. §§ 824a(b),
824d(a) (1976). Many disputes, however, do not fall within the jurisdiction of the Com-
mission. If, for instance, a coordinating group cannot decide how to compensate a
participant for the donation of a choice site for a jointly owned generating plant, the
plant will not be built.
39. [C]entral dispatch often means operation by committee with no one really in
charge. In fact, some pool agreements provide that no major policy decision can be
taken unless there is unanimous agreement. This then results in much pulling &
hauling to assure that decisions are satisfactory to all members of the Pool, but not
necessarily to the public.
National Energy Act Hearings, supra note 21, pt. 3, at 655 (statement of Alvin Kaufman,
Congressional Research Service).
40. Cost-apportionment problems and the absence of effective leadership led to the
breakup of the Carolinas-Virginia Pool and the Illinois-Missouri Pool. STRUCURAL RE-
FORM, supra note 33, at 32. The Kentucky-Indiana Pool abandoned the cooperative
development of new generating plants because pool members could not agree on terms
for the addition of two proposed nuclear units to the pool. Public Utility Hearings, supra
note 19, pt. 3, at 160 (statement of David J. Bardin, Deputy Administrator, FEA).
41. The problem is endemic to pooling. A consultant studying the then-proposed New
England Power Pool in 1970 warned:
Each utility must view proposals from the viewpoint of the interests of its own
customers and stockholders which are not necessarily the same as the interests of New
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Problems of committee decisionmaking and cost allocation appear
to be inherent in the operation of a power pool. By contrast, some
obstacles to full coordination stem from the structure of the regulatory
regime imposed by federal and state laws, especially the latter. State
public utility commissions regulate many aspects of electric utility
operations, including retail tariffs, power plant siting, standards of
service, and environmental protection.42 Some states discourage utilities
from taking a regional perspective in planning bulk-power facilities.43
Others restrict the authority of their publicly chartered utilities to
undertake joint ventures with investor-owned systems.44 Another ob-
stacle to joint ventures is the fact that a project may require the ap-
proval of commissions in three or four states, each of which has dif-
ferent rules on cost recovery and environmental protection. The lack
of coordination among state regulators inhibits interstate ventures
by the firms they regulate.
45
Both state commissions and the FERC employ a system of rate
regulation that arguably discourages coordination initiatives. Cost-of-
service regulation permits the utility to recover from customers a fixed
percentage of its rate base: the capital cost of plant and equipment.
According to an influential theory, this method of price supervision
induces a distortion in the investment pattern of regulated firms.
Averch and Johnson hypothesize that a monopolist earning a per-
England. There is thus no assurance in this concept that the fundamental objective
of a single system approach to regional power planning-based on regional interests
being paramount-will be achieved.
H. Zinder & Associates, Inc., A Study of the Electric Power Situation in New England 63
(1970) (study prepared for New England Regional Comm'n) [hereinafter cited as Zinder].
42. For an overview of the areas regulated by state public utility commissions, see R.
Marritz 9- G. Culp, Governmental Impediments to Electric System Efficiency Through
Integration 32-51 (Feb. 28, 1979) (report prepared for Department of Energy).
43. For instance, a state may not permit its regulated utilities to invest capital in
another state. The original plans for the now infamous Seabrook nuclear power plant in
New Hampshire called for a joint venture by three utilities, including Central Maine
Power Company. Central Maine later withdrew, citing as one of its reasons a state rule
excluding out-of-state property from the rate base. Zinder, supra note 41, at 64.
44. See R. Marritz & G. Culp, supra note 42, at 39-42. Congress addressed this problem
in 1978 by giving the FERC the authority to exempt electric utilities from any provision
of state law that prevents voluntary coordination, "if the Commission determines that
such voluntary coordination is designed to obtain economical utilization of facilities and
resources in any area." Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-617,
§ 205(a), 92 Stat. 3, 117 (1978) (codified at 16 U.S.C.A. § 824a-l(a) (West Supp. 1979)). No
exemption may be granted, however, from a state law that:
(1) is required by any authority of Federal law, or
(2) is designed to protect public health, safety, or welfare, or the environment or
conserve energy or is designed to mitigate the effects of emergencies resulting from
fuel shortages.
Id.
45. See STRUCTURAL REFoP , supra note 33, at 32-33.
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centage return on its invested capital will utilize excessively capital-
intensive methods of production, whenever the allowed rate of return
exceeds the cost of capital.46 The Averch-Johnson effect would dis-
courage the adoption of coordination techniques, many of which reduce
or postpone the need for capital investment. 47
Economists debate the impact of the Averch-Johnson effect on
electric-utility decisionmaking, 48 but one need not accept the theory
in toto to acknowledge that a regulated monopolist feels less pressure
than firms in competitive industries to minimize capital outlays and
to pursue cost-cutting innovations. 49 The substitution of regulation for
competition at the production stage partially explains the survival of
inefficiently small bulk-power supply systems.
The limited competition that does occur between utilities also tends
to impede the realization of scale economies. One important form of
rivalry in the industry today is competition for the franchise to dis-
tribute retail electricity. Given the natural monopoly character of local
distribution, most states impose territorial restrictions that prevent
direct competition between two or more retailers in the same com-
munity. ° Legal restrictions may also prevent one investor-owned
utility from competing for the distribution franchise of a neighboring
private company.Y' In many states, however, citizens dissatisfied with
46. Averch &- Johnson, Behavior of the Firm Under Regulatory Constraint, 52 AM.
EcoN. REV. 1052 (1962).
47. 2 A. KAHN, supra note 9, at 50-51. Kahn also noted that the Averch-Johnson effect
might bias a utility against purchasing power or leasing facilities from others, because
"when a distribution company purchases power [or leases capacity] from one of its
partners, it receives nothing more than reimbursement for those actual expenses, whereas
if it generates the power itself it has an expanded rate base on which it is entitled to a
return," id. at 51.
48. Dreyer and MacAvoy point out that empirical evidence does not entirely support
the Averch-Johnson theory. Utilities regularly resist certain types of rate-base expansion,
e.g., pollution control expenditures. S. BREYER &= P. MAcAVoY, supra note 16, at 108.
However, this may indicate the role of other factors in firm decisionmaking, rather than
any fault in the basic hypothesis.
49. See Meeks, supra note 19, at 85 (footnotes omitted) ("When rates are set on a cost-
plus-fair-profit basis, there is little incentive to reduce costs since profits will not thereby
be increased. At the same time, the company's monopoly position insulates it from sub-
stantial injury by competitors' cost-reducing innovations.")
50. Fewer than 30 communities in the United States support two or more competing
distribution systems. Public Utility Hearings, supra note 19, pt. 2, at 424 (statement of
Abraham Gerber and Joe D. Pace). For an outline of the devices by which states and
municipalities control entry at the distribution stage, see Meeks, supra note 19, at 95-99.
51. See, e.g., Electric Supplier Act, §§ 3.5, 5, ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 111 2/3, §§ 403.5, 405
(Smith-Hurd 1966) (no electric supplier may serve customer of another supplier without
consent of previous supplier and of Commission; "electric supplier" includes investor-
owned firms and rural electric coops but not municipal systems); Omo REV. CODE ANN.
§§ 4933.83, .87 (Page Supp. 1978) ("each electric supplier shall have the exclusive right to
furnish electric service . . . within its certified territory," but provision does not apply
to municipal corporations).
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the performance of a franchise holder may vote to establish a municipal
distribution company. 52 The existence of this option puts pressure on
investor-owned firms to hold down rates and to provide high-quality
service.
53
The average municipal system, serving only one town, sells much
less power than its investor-owned competitor.54 Small distributors,
public or private, face a formidable challenge in trying to find an
economical source of bulk power. The economies of scale in generator
size make 100%, ownership of a new generating unit impractical for all
but a handful of the largest municipal utilities.55 Most publicly owned
systems meet the growing demand for electricity either by purchasing
it at wholesale56 or by purchasing a small share of a new generating
plant.
In this context, vertically integrated systems use their control over
the regional transmission network to isolate competing distributors
from potential pooling partners or outside vendors of bulk power.
Many small distributors operate as islands in the territorial sea of a
large vertically integrated system. The integrated firm can prevent an
isolated distributor from importing power, simply by refusing to
"wheel" it over the transmission grid.57 Isolation of the distributor
52. At the distribution stage economies of scale are a function of load density, rather
than the absolute size of the distribution system. Weiss, supra note 12, at 145. In other
words, it would be very inefficient to have two sets of distribution lines on the same
street, but efficiency does not require horizontal integration over many load centers. A
municipal distributor operating in only one community can provide service that is com-
parable in cost and quality to that provided by a much larger firm serving many load
centers. 1964 POWER SuRvEY, supra note 10, at 28.
53. As one spokesman for local publicly owned systems stated, the mere existence of
such systems "is a continuing reminder that a public abused may exercise its inherent
right to operate directly their public business." National Energy Act Hearings, supra note
21, pt. 3, at 544 (statement of George Spiegel). In 1975 the United States contained
2,224 local publicly owned utilities and 982 rural electric cooperatives. PUB. POWER, Jan.-
Feb. 1978, at 36. In recent years, however, investor-owned companies have been absorbing
municipal systems faster than they are being formed. Between 1960 and 1969, 23 new
municipal systems were formed and 72 were taken over by investor-owned companies.
Fairman & Scott, supra note 17, at 1163 n.20.
54. In 1975 the 256 private power companies sold 77.3% of the electric power pur-
chased at retail, while 2,224 local publicly owned systems, 982 rural coops, and 8 federal
power marketing agencies divided the remaining 22.7%. PUB. POWER, Jan.-Feb. 1978, at 36.
55. Fairman & Scott, supra note 17, at 1196 ("[Technological advances increasing both
the size and relative efficiency of larger generators, coupled with unprecedented fuel price
increases, have pushed the minimum feasible investment in generation well beyond the
reach of the smaller systems.")
56. About 1,000 local public power systems purchase some or all of their bulk-power
requirements at wholesale. Public Utility Hearings, supra note 19, pt. 1, at 735 (statement
of Alex Radin, American Public Power Association).
57. Id. at 736-37. "Wheeling" is the transmission of bulk power by one utility for
another. Contractually, the service may be viewed as the transportation of a stipulated
1522
Vol. 88: 1511, 1979
Electric Power
from external suppliers forces it either to purchase its wholesale re-
quirements from the integrated firm, or to build an inefficiently small
generator, in which case the distributor becomes vulnerable at franchise
renewal time."
In Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States,59 the Supreme Court
condemned, as a violation of the Sherman Act, the use by an integrated
firm of its transmission monopoly to destroy a municipal competitor.
In so holding the Court recognized that the firm that controls the
transmission network in a given area controls the bulk-power market
in that area.60 Unfortunately, the antitrust remedy has not proven to
be a very effective deterrent. 1 Integrated firms still practice many
volume of electricity from the point at which power is pumped onto the grid to the
point at which it is removed. Physically, however, power does not actually flow from
point to point. Electricity in a transmission line acts like water under pressure. The in-
troduction of energy at point A changes the pressure at all other points on the grid.
Load centers move and the direction of flow may reverse in some lines. Wheeling transac-
tions require planning, because the introduction of new load at point A changes the level
of stress on every interconnected line. Id., pt. 2, at 411-12 (statement of Abraham Gerber
and Joe D. Pace).
58. See Taylor, supra note 9, at 50:
If . . . the municipals [sic] costs of service are higher than those of the private
utilities, then the customers of the municipals would be forced to pay unnecessarily
high rates, and the municipals might be forced to sell out to the private utilities or
restrict their operations to fewer and smaller retail markets.
59. 410 U.S. 366 (1973). Otter Tail is a vertically integrated private utility serving a
large territory in Minnesota, North Dakota, and South Dakota. In the 1960s the Company
distributed electricity at retail to 465 towns in the tri-state area under municipally
granted franchises that varied in length between 10 and 20 years. United States v. Otter
Tail Power Co., 331 F. Supp. 54, 57 (D. Minn. 1971), aff'd, 410 U.S. 366 (1973). The
citizens of Elbow Lake, Minnesota and Hankinson, North Dakota decided not to renew
the Company's franchise. They planned instead to purchase subsidized bulk power from
the Bureau of Reclamation and to distribute it themselves. Id. at 60. The viability of
this plan depended on the purchase of wheeling service from Otter Tail, for the private
system owned the only transmission link between the Bureau's trunk line and the two
towns. Id. at 60-61.
In an attempt to keep its former retail customers within the fold, Otter Tail refused
to wheel power or sell wholesale power to the towns. Id. at 61. Hankinson eventually
capitulated and renewed Otter Tail's franchise. Id. Elbow Lake built a small, inefficient
generating plant. Id. at 60. The Justice Department brought a successful antitrust action
against the private firm, and alleged that the refusal to wheel or sell power to municipali-
ties formerly served at retail constituted the use of monopoly power to destroy threatened
competition in violation of § 2 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1976). See 410 U.S. at
368-72.
60. The Supreme Court relied upon the finding below that "Otter Tail has 'a strategic
dominance in the transmission of power in most of its service area' and that it used this
dominance to foreclose potential entrants into the retail area from obtaining electric
power from outside sources of supply." 410 U.S. at 377 (quoting United States v. Otter
Tail Power Co., 331 F. Supp. 54, 60 (D. Minn. 1971)). Otter Tail has been analyzed as a
"bottleneck monopoly" case: one in which a vertically integrated monopolist controls
entry at a second level by virtue of his monopoly at the first level. Note, Refusals to
Deal by Vertically Integrated Monopolists, 87 HARV. L. REv. 1720, 1722-24 (1974).
61. See p. 1531 infra.
1523
The Yale Law Journal Vol. 88: 1511, 1979
forms of anticompetitive conduct, including refusals to wheel power, 2
price discrimination between their own distribution subsidiaries and
wholesale customers, 3 and the exclusion of retail competitors from the
benefits of pooling.
0 4
These anticompetitive tactics have short- and long-term conse-
quences. In the short term, they represent a conscious decision to forego
coordination opportunities in order to maintain a competitive advan-
tage. Of course, the advantage accrues only to stockholders of the
integrated firm, not to its customers or to those of the isolated small
distributor. The long-term consequence of refusals to coordinate is that
small utilities face a bleak future,65 even at the distribution stage
where efficiency does not require large-scale operation.00
The reduction of competition at the distribution stage might be
acceptable if vertical integration made utilities more efficient. That,
however, is not the case. Utilities strive to integrate forward to obtain
the security of a guaranteed outlet for their product and backward for
a dependable supply of bulk power. But vertical integration does not
significantly reduce the cost of operation at any stage of the industry.
7
62. Many cases document the existence of a general policy among integrated firms
not to wheel for retail competitors. E.g., Gulf States Utils. Co. V. FPC, 411 U.S. 747, 752
(1973); Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366, 368 (1973); Niagara Mohawk
Power Corp. v. FPC, 538 F.2d 966 (2d Cir. 1976); see National Energy Act Hearings, supra
note 21, pt. 3, at 553 (statement of George Spiegel); STANFORD ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
SoCIETY, GEOTHERMAL ENERGY: LEGAL PROBLEMS OF REsouRcE DEVELOPMENT 129 (1975)
(refusal of Pacific Gas & Electric Co. to wheel power for municipal systems in its service
area).
63. Small distributors lacking generation facilities often are forced to purchase their
bulk-power requirements from the competing private system. In this setting the in-
tegrated firm may institute a price squeeze that raises the price of wholesale power to the
point at which the distributor cannot compete at retail. As of June 1976, 49 price-squeeze
cases involving utilities in 27 states were pending before the FPC. Fairman 9= Scott, supra
note 17, at 1173 n.55 (citing Hearings on H.R. 15544, Emergency Federal Power Act, Be-
fore the Subcomm. on Energy and Power of the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign
Commerce, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1976) (statement of Rep. McFall)). Price-squeeze alle-
gations have also been raised in the courts. See Conway Corp. v. FPC, 510 F.2d 1264, 1266-
67 (D.C., Cir. 1975), affd, 426 U.S. 271 (1976); City of Mishawaka v. Indiana & Mich. Elec.
Co., 560 F.2d 1314, 1316 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 922 (1978).
64. See note 17 supra.
65. See S. REP. No. 1394, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1976) ("The national trend is toward
consolidation of utility systems, particularly the acquisition by investor owned utilities of
small publicly owned systems through what sometimes amounts to a forced sale.") [here-
inafter cited as S. REP. 1394]. The 1950s and 1960s saw the number of private utilities
reduced, by merger, from 581 in 1955, to 472 in 1965. In the same interval about 150
municipal systems were acquired. Weiss, supra note 12, at 165. More recently, the Justice
Department has intervened before the SEC to oppose two planned acquisitions by large
investor-owned utilities. Id. at 165-66.
66. See note 52 supra.
67. See Meeks, supra note 19, at 76 ("[T]he necessity of monopoly at one level of the
industry does not require the vertical extension of monopoly to other levels. Such vertical
integration by ownership of generation, transmission, and distribution is neither tech-
nologically nor economically necessary."); accord, Taylor, supra note 9, at 34; Weiss, supra
note 12, at 156-57.
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No by-product of the struggle between integrated firms and isolated
distributors compensates consumers for the hidden costs attributable to
lost coordination opportunities.
C. Coordination as a Goal of Federal Regulatory Policy
1. The Federal Power Act
Congressional initiatives to improve the efficiency of the nation's
bulk-power supply began with Title II of the Public Utility Act of
1935,08 now codified as part of the Federal Power Act. 69 The Act
directed the FPC to "promote and encourage... interconnection and
coordination."70 This ringing mandate concealed an ambivalent con-
gressional intent. The statute empowered the Commission to promote
only the voluntary interconnection and coordination of electric-power
facilities.7' The Senate Commerce Committee deleted language from
the bill that would have imposed common-carrier obligations on trans-
mission-line owners.72 As enacted, the statute authorized the FPC to
order a utility selling power in interstate commerce to interconnect
with another firm, and to sell or exchange power with another utility."
But the Commission could not order one utility to wheel for another,7 4
nor could it compel utilities to join a power pool. The Commission's
jurisdiction over voluntarily organized pools was, and is, limited to
determining whether rate schedules contained in the pooling agree-
ment are unjust, unreasonable, or unduly discriminatory.7 5
68. Ch. 687, 49 Stat. 838 (1935).
69. 16 U.S.C. §§ 791a.825r (1976). The Federal Power Act has three parts. Subchapter I,
which empowers the FPC (now FERC) to license hydroelectric projects on navigable
waters, originally was enacted as the Federal Water Power Act of 1920, ch. 285, 41 Stat.
1063. The Public Utility Act of 1935 added Subchapters II and III, and renamed the
entire statute the Federal Power Act.
70. 16 U.S.C. § 824a (1976).
71. See id. ("Mhe Commission is empowered and directed to divide the country into
regional districts for the voluntary interconnection and coordination of facilities for the
generation, transmission and sale of electric energy .... ")
72. See Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366, 384-85 (1973) (Stewart, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (discussion of legislative history of Public
Utility Act of 1935). The relevant language of the bill provided that "It shall be the duty
of every public utility to . . . transmit energy for any person upon reasonable request
therefore." Id. at 384 (quoting S.1725, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. § 213 (1935)). Had this language
been enacted, utilities owning transmission lines would have been obligated to serve as
common carriers of bulk power.
73. 16 U.S.C. § 824a(b) (1976).
74. Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366, 375 (1973) (footnote omitted)
("So far as wheeling is concerned, there is no authority granted the Commission under
Part II of the Federal Power Act to order it, for the bills originally introduced con-
tained common carrier provisions which were deleted.")
75. [Trhe scope of a power pool is in the first instance a matter for the utilities
involved. The mere fact that a particular pool does not offer the same range of
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For forty years the FPC operated under this narrow grant of
authority. The publicly owned sector of the industry found the law
most unsatisfactory, for it gave isolated distributors no leverage with
which to obtain the benefits of coordination. Over the years, proponents
of mandatory coordination introduced numerous bills to confer in-
creased powers on the FPC,70 but without success. Not until 1978 was
Congress persuaded to authorize an incremental expansion of the
Commission's jurisdiction over coordination practices.
The Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 197877 contains a weak
version of the common-carrier scheme that Congress rejected in 1935.
The Federal Power Act, as amended in 1978, now authorizes the
FERC, upon the application of any electric utility or federal marketing
agency, to order any other utility to provide transmission services to
the applicant.78 If necessary, the Commission may order the enlarge-
ment of transmission capacity to meet the needs of a wheeling customer,
at that customer's expense.79 The Act does not authorize the FERC to
organize power pools, or to require open admission to power pools, 0
although the legislation that President Carter sent to Congress would
have given the Commission this authority."'
In principle, common-carrier regulation should promote both co-
ordination and competition. As the Otter Tail case illustrates, small
distributors are isolated because they lack access to coordinating part-
ners and suppliers of bulk power, other than the utility that surrounds
services as another pool does not permit the Commission to direct expansion of the
narrower pools' [sic] scope. Unless the limited scope of the MAPP Agreement is for
some other reason unjust, unreasonable or unduly discriminatory, we are not autho-
rized under Part II of the Federal Power Act to direct the pool to offer more
services.
Mid-Continent Area Power Pool Agreement, [1977] UTIL. L. REP. (CCH) 11,958, at
12,295 (FPC 1977), appeal docketed sub nom. Alexandria Bd. of Pub. Works v. FERC,
No. 77-1916 (D.C. Cir. Oct. 7, 1977).
76. The dissenting opinion in Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366
(1973), recites the legislative history of many unsuccessful attempts to amend the Federal
Power Act, up to 1973, id. at 386 nA. These efforts continued in subsequent sessions of
Congress. See, e.g., S. 3311, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976); S. 3483, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974).
77. Pub. L. No. 95-617, 92 Stat. 3117 (1978).
78. 16 U.S.C.A. § 824j(a) (West Supp. 1979). But see p. 1527 infra (discussing severe
restrictions on scope of FERC's authority to require wheeling).
79. 16 U.S.C.A. § 824j(a) (West Supp. 1979).
80. The 1978 legislation did not enhance FERC's authority to promote pooling, except
in one respect. It gave the Commission a limited power to exempt utilities from state
rules that prevent voluntary coordination. See id. § 824a-(1)(a), discussed in note 44 supra.
In addition, the Act directed the Commission to carry out a study of the opportunities to
improve energy conservation, efficiency, and reliability through pooling. 16 U.S.C.A.
§ 824a-l(b) (West Supp. 1979).
81. S. 1469, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. § 521 (1977).
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them.8 2 The availability of wheeling would enable any distributor to
purchase power from any producer within transmission distance. It
would facilitate reserve sharing, as well as the exchange of economy
energy and peak capacity, between systems that are not directly inter-
connected. 3 No longer would transmission restrictions prevent small
utilities from owning part of a generating plant. The refusal of in-
tegrated firms to wheel prevents small and large utilities from realizing
these economies.
Unfortunately, the 1978 legislation is encumbered by a crop of
caveats and conditions that gravely weaken the authority conferred.
Most significantly, the Commission may issue no wheeling order that
would disturb "existing competitive relationships."8 4 Furthermore, an
electric utility may not be compelled to wheel electricity that would
replace power currently provided to the applicant by the transmission-
line owner.s  In other words, the Act ignored one major cause of lost
coordination opportunities-the denial of transmission services to a
distribution-stage competitor. By failing to address this issue it per-
petuates the isolation of independent distributors and obstructs the
development of a competitive market in bulk power.
Even if these dysfunctional provisions were removed, the objectives
of the 1978 Act would be frustrated by fundamental flaws in the
82. See 410 U.S. at 370 (footnote omitted) ("Proposed municipal systems have great
obstacles; they must purchase the electric power at wholesale. To do so they must have
access to existing transmission lines. The only ones available belong to Otter Tail.")
83. There is already a significant volume of bulk-power sales between noncontiguous
utilities. See, e.g., New England Power Pool Participants (Coal-By-Wire), 52 F.P.C. 410
(1974), affl'd sub nor. Richmond Power & Light v. FERC, 574 F.2d 610 (D.C. Cir. 1978)
(reviewing legality of rate schedules filed by eastern utilities for transmission of economy
energy from midwestern generating plants to New England). Under standard industry
practice, however, "each utility or pool pays its neighbor for the service provided; a
particular coal-by-wire transmission can involve four or more individual charges." 574
F.2d at 618. Each utility along the route makes a separate charge for the service, and the
cumulative wheeling charges may greatly exceed the incremental cost to the carriers of
providing the transmission service. National Energy Act Hearings, supra note 21, pt. 3, at
638 (statement of George Spiegel). The "daisy-chain of separate transmission rate
schedules" prevents interconnected utilities from dispatching their generating plants in
the most efficient possible manner. Id. at 549.
84. 16 U.S.C.A. § 824j(c)(l) (West Supp. 1979). In addition, the FERC may issue a
wheeling order only if it finds that such an order 1) is in the public interest, id. § 824j
(a)(l); 2) will either conserve a significant amount of energy, significantly promote effi-
ciency, or improve the reliability of the applicant, id. § 824j(a)(2); 3) is not likely to result
in an uncompensated economic loss for any electric utility, qualifying cogenerator, or
qualifying small power producer affected by the order, id. § 824k(a)(1); 4) will not place
an undue burden on a utility, cogenerator, or small power producer affected by the
order, id. § 824k(a)(2); 5) will not unreasonably impair the reliability of any electric
utility affected by the order, id. § 824k(a)(3); and 6) will not impair the ability of any
utility affected by the order to render adequate service to its customers, id. § 824k(a)(4).
85. Id. § 824i(c)(2)(B).
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common-carrier scheme. Common-carrier regulation is all "stick" and
no "carrot." It offers the transmission-line owner no incentive to wheel
power, but rather imposes the obligation on a carrier that, for competi-
tive or other reasons, does not welcome the business. Price supervision
of a monopolist is difficult enough when the purveyor of the com-
modity is eager to sell it. For the firm that seeks to avoid dealing with
a competitor, the regulatory process affords seemingly limitless op-
portunities for footdragging.
The FERC has jurisdiction over all rates for the transmission or sale
of electricity at wholesale in interstate commerce. 80 When a utility files
a wheeling tariff or any other rate schedule customers may apply im-
mediately to receive the service. But the customer may not know, for
a number of years, how much the service will cost, and what restric-
tions will apply. In 1973 the Otter Tail Power Company, following its
loss in the Supreme Court,87 filed a tariff to wheel power for the
village of Elbow Lake, Minnesota. 8 The ensuing ratemaking case,
interrupted by several appeals to the federal courts, has consumed six
years, 89 and the company has yet to file a rate schedule that is acceptable
to the Commission.9 ° In all probability, final approval of a wheeling
tariff is still several years away. 91
86. Id. § 824(b)(1); 16 U.S.C. § 824d(a)-(c) (1976).
87. Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366 (1973), discussed in note 59
supra.
88. Otter Tail Power Co., 50 F.P.C. 1341 (1973) (order accepting filing).
89. The most recent FERC opinion in the Otter Tail rate case contains a procedural
history of what the administrative law judge referred to as "the long trail of litigation
which marks the tortured course of dealings between Otter Tail and its municipal
customers." Otter Tail Power Co., Nos. ER77-5 & E-8152, Initial Decision at 3 (FERC
Sept. 15, 1978).
90. On September 15, 1978 the administrative law judge rejected Otter Tail's proposed
wheeling rates, and ordered the company to file revised rates taking into account certain
findings as to cost of service. Id. at 33. Otter Tail and its municipal customers each have
filed exceptions to the Initial Decision. Telephone interview with Wilbur C. Earley,
industry economist, FERC (Mar. 27, 1979).
91. Otter Tail is a case of first impression, in that it involves the first "pure" wheeling
tariff ever filed with the Commission. Otter Tail Power Co., Nos. ER77-5 & E-8152, Initial
Decision at 2 (FERC Sept. 15, 1978). Hence each important issue is appealed to the courts.
But the cost-of-service issues that have already taken up more than a year are common
to every wheeling rate case. The administrative law judge heard extensive testimony on
the issue of what capital assets should be included in Otter Tail's transmission rate base.
Wheeling customers should be required to share in the amortization only of equipment
that serves a transmission function. Thus the first task of the regulator in setting a
wheeling tariff is to "functionalize" the capital plant of the carrier into its production,
transmission, and distribution components. The problem is that a transmission investment
may serve a production function, and vice versa. For instance, an integrated firm may
find it cheaper to build one large generating plant midway between two load centers
than to build two smaller plants close to the load centers. By increasing its transmission
investment the utility can spend less on generating equipment. The regulator must decide




In addition to cost-of-service issues, the FERC must weigh the
legality of proposed restrictions on access to the transmission grid.
Carriers may attempt to restrict the availability of the service, e.g., by
limiting points of entry to the grid . 2 If upheld, these restrictions re-
duce the value of the service to the customer.
Regulatory delay and uncertainty about the cost and scope of service
undermine coordination incentives in several ways. First, the feasibility
of any bulk-power transaction naturally depends on its cost, a major
component of which is transmission cost. If the applicant cannot obtain
a firm price for wheeling until several years after the commencement
of service, long-range planning may be critically impaired.93 Secondly,
the high transaction cost of participating in a rate case may in itself
deter utilities, especially small ones, from seeking transmission services.
Thirdly, many coordination opportunities last for only a few hours or
days. Transmission service must be available on short notice, or the
opportunity is lost. As FERC economist Gordon Taylor noted: "The
attempt to transact short-term bulk power services can be blocked by
. . . insisting in each case on separate negotiations for the use of a
transmission line .... Stalling potential transactions until they are no
longer available is as effective as a refusal to deal."' 4
2. The Antitrust Laws
Utilities unable to obtain transmission services from a competitor
have argued that the FERC should be required to enforce the antitrust
laws against firms that refuse to coordinate in order to injure a com-
petitor. In Gulf States Utilities Co. v. FPC,95 the Supreme Court
92. In 1977, the Florida Power and Light Company filed a proposed tariff for the
wheeling of power from the Crystal River nuclear plant to the municipal utility of New
Smyrna Beach, Florida. The proposed tariff limits the city to its share of the power actu-
ally produced by the Crystal River Plant. Power may be wheeled across the grid in one
direction only, and between specified points of entry and exit. FERC staff witnesses claim
that the only rationale for these restrictions is to limit the city's access to other coordi-
nating partners. Florida Power & Light Co., No. ER77-175, at 32 (FERC 1977) (statement
of Dr. Gordon T.C. Taylor, staff economist, FERC) [hereinafter cited as Taylor II with
page citations to prepared statement].
FERC staff also objected to the inclusion of unduly restrictive conditions in the Otter
Tail wheeling tariff. See Otter Tail Power Co., Nos. ER77-5 & E-8152, at 9-13 (FERC
1977) (statement of John K. Sammon, electrical engineer, FERC) [page citations to pre-
pared statement].
93. See Taylor II, supra note 92, at 20 ("FP&L's failure to promulgate a general
wheeling rate prohibits parties from knowing before hand whether or not particular
agreements would be prudent.')
94. Taylor, suPra note 9, at 51.
95. 411 U.S. 747 (1973).
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agreed that the FPC, like other regulatory agencies, 96 has a responsi-
bility to consider "the fundamental national economic policy expressed
in the antitrust laws."9 7 However, subsequent cases suggest that the
Commission remains somewhat insensitive to allegations of anticom-
petitive conduct by utilities.98 Congressional proponents of closer
coordination, aware of the agency's conservatism, introduced legisla-
tion in 1976 and 1977 that would have required the FPC to consider
allegations of unfair competition in regulatory proceedings and to take
corrective action when warranted. 99 None of these proposals was
enacted. They might not have been necessary, in light of the holding
in Gulf States, but the Senate Commerce Committee nevertheless saw
a need to codify the Commission's antitrust responsibilities: "Since no
two cases are exactly alike, the FPC could continue to interpret the
Supreme Court decisions narrowly and thus continue its past practice
of declining to consider such allegations."'10 0
96. See Denver & R.G.W.R.R. v. United States, 387 U.S. 485 (1967) (Interstate Com-
merce Commission, in reviewing applications to issue securities, must consider anticom-
petitive consequences of activities financed by issue).
97. 411 U.S. at 759. In 1970 Gulf States Utilities applied to the FPC for permission to
float a bond issue. Section 204 of the Federal Power Act, 16 U.S.C. § 824c (1976), requires
the approval of the FERC (then the FPC) before any regulated utility can issue securities.
The cities of Lafayette and Plaquemine, Louisiana intervened, contending that the bonds
would finance anticompetitive activities, including the refusal of Gulf States to wheel
power for the Louisiana Electric Cooperative. The cities petitioned the FPC to condition
authorization of the bonds on the cessation of this conduct. The Commission refused to
consider the matters raised by the cities, and held that alleged antitrust violations are
"irrelevant to the purposes of issuing bonds," Gulf States Utils. Co., 44 F.P.C. 1524, 1526
(1970). The Court of Appeals remanded the case to the Commission for consideration of
the cities' claims. City of Lafayette v. SEC, 454 F.2d 941 (D.C. Cir. 1971), aff'd sub nora.
Gulf States Utils. Co. v. FPC, 411 U.S. 747 (1973).
98. In FPC v. Conway Corp., 426 U.S. 271 (1976), the Commission argued unsuccess-
fully that it lacks authority to compare retail and wholesale rate schedules of an in-
tegrated vendor of electricity for evidence of a price squeeze against a wholesale customer.
Id. at 277. In 1977 the Commission approved the Mid-Continent Area Power Pool
Agreement (MAPP) over the protest of 80 small, publicly owned utilities that were ex-
cluded from the pool. Mid-Continent Area Power Pool Agreement, [1977] UTIL. L. REP.
(CCH) 11,958 (FPC 1977), appeal docketed sub noa. Alexandria Bd. of Pub. Works v.
FERC, No. 77-1916 (D.C. Cir. Oct. 7, 1977). The MAPP agreement includes, inter alia,
rate schedules fixing prices for most bulk-power transactions between MAPP members
and commitments by member firms not to purchase power from outside of MAPP until
the surpluses of MAPP members are exhausted. Brief of Petitioners at 20-21, Alexandria
Bd. of Pub. Works v. FERC, No. 77-1916 (D.C. Cir. Oct. 7, 1977). The Commission has
been criticized for taking an exceedingly cautious view of its own authority to promote
coordination: "The FPC has more authority than it is willing to exercise because many
of the Commissioners have been cautious, conservative people, looking at any possible
ambiguity in the statute as a reason not to act." National Energy Act Hearings, supra
note 21, pt. 3, at 539 (statement of George Spiegel). See also S. BREYER & P. MAcAvoy,
supra note 16, at 115 (FPC overlooked possible sources of authority in Federal Power Act
to compel wheeling).
99. S. 3311, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. § 205 (1976); H.R. 6660, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. § 105
(1977).
100. S. RaP. 1394, supra note 65, at 7.
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The reluctance of the FPC to require coordination forces isolated
utilities to pursue other remedies. The Otter Tail decision conclusively
determined that regulated electric utilities enjoy no immunity from
the antitrust laws.101 Unfortunately for plaintiffs, proving that a bulk-
power supplier illegally refused to coordinate or to wheel power is but
the first of many rivers to cross. The successful plaintiff must then
litigate ratemaking issues before the FERC, with all of the attendant
delays and disincentives discussed above. It is instructive to note that
the antitrust complaint that paved the way for the current Otter Tail
rate case was filed by the Justice Department in 1969.102
More generally, neither the antitrust remedy nor mandatory wheel-
ing offer an adequate substitute for voluntary coordination. These
remedies are designed to alter a pattern of conduct among bulk-power
suppliers, but both remedies ignore the factors that cause firms to
forego scale economies. In some industries it may be possible to ac-
complish policy objectives by the enforcement of performance stan-
dards. But performance standards cannot elicit the shared commit-
ment to efficiency that is a necessary ingredient of any complex
coordination scheme. Guidelines prescribing the development of coor-
dination initiatives would have to be so broad as to be virtually un-
enforceable. Unless federal power planners are prepared to assume the
day-to-day management of the nation's utilities, regulatory reform
must be directed toward eliminating the disincentives to efficiency
stemming from the regulatory process and the pressures of the market-
place. With one minor exception, 03 Congress has yet to address these
problems.
3. The Atomic Energy Act
The antitrust bow has one more string. A 1970 amendment to the
Atomic Energy Act of 1954104 gave the Attorney General a role in
licensing of nuclear power plants. Before granting a license, the
Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) must refer applications to the
Justice Department for antitrust review.'0 5 If the Attorney General
finds that activities conducted under the license would offend the
antitrust laws he may recommend that the NRC hold a hearing on
antitrust issues, as part of the licensing process. The scope of the pre-
101. 410 U.S. at 373-74.
102. 2 A. KAHN, supra note 9, at 68 n.60.
103. In 1978, Congress gave the FERC authority to exempt utilities from certain state
rules that block voluntary coordination. See note 44 supra.
104. Atomic Energy Act Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-560, § 6,84 Stat. 1472, 1473
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2135(c) (1976)).
105. 42 U.S.C. § 2135(c)(1) (1976).
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licensing review may encompass "the relationship of the specific
nuclear facility to the applicant's total system or power pool."' 0 6 The
Commission must make a finding as to "whether the activities under
the license would create or maintain a situation inconsistent with the
antitrust laws.' 10 7 If they would, the NRC has the authority to condi-
tion licenses upon the elimination of any potential anticompetitive
effects.'0 8
In practice, utilities seeking construction permits chafe at the delays,
expense, and publicity that attend antitrust hearings before NRC
licensing boards.'0 9 Many applicants avoid hearings by negotiating
license conditions with the Justice Department or with the NRC.' 10
The antitrust review process has given small utilities a powerful lever
with which to obtain access to large-scale generating units. 1  By April
1978, prelicensing review had produced twenty-six commitments to
offer local municipal systems an ownership interest in a nuclear plant,
twenty-eight commitments to wheel power for other electric systems,
and twenty-seven commitments to share reserves with other systems."1
2
106. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 6 A.E.C. 619, 621 (1973).
107. 42 U.S.C. § 2135(c)(5) (1976).
108. Id. § 2135(c)(6).
109. The President of the Alabama Power Company participated in one of the few
full hearings conducted to date by the NRC. He characterized it as a "monstrous review
proceeding," involving two years of prehearing discovery, and 169 hearing days that
filled 28,000 transcript pages. Public Utility Hearings, supra note 19, pt. 2, at 99 (state-
ment of Joseph M. Farley, President, Alabama Power Co.).
110. By the end of 1978, the Justice Department had conducted or was conducting
antitrust review in connection with 91 nuclear plant construction permit applications. Of
these 91, 17 were recommended for hearing; 24 were recommended for no hearing because
applicants agreed to antitrust license conditions; 49 were recommended for no hearing
without need for conditions, and one was pending. [1978] NRC ANN. REP. 54. By May
1978 only three cases had been litigated before NRC licensing boards. See Department of
Justice Budget Authorization: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 95th
Cong., 2d Sess. 268 (1978) (statement of Assistant Attorney General John H. Shenefield).
In two of those cases the board found that the licensing of the plant would create or
maintain a situation inconsistent with the antitrust laws unless conditions were attached
to the license guaranteeing that small, publicly owned systems would have access to
power from the nuclear units. See Toledo Edison Co. (Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station,
Units 1, 2, and 3), [1975-1978 Transfer Binder] NucrAR REG. REP. (CCH) 30,134, at
30,134.14 (1977); Alabama Power Co. (Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant, Units I and 2),
[1975-1978 Transfer Binder] NUCLEAR REG. REP. (CCH) 30,210, at 30,210.02 (1977). In the
third case an appeal board reached the same conclusion. Consumers Power Co. (Midland
Plant, Units I and 2), [1975-1978 Transfer Binder] NUCLEAR REG. REP. (CCH) 30,263, at
30,263.22 (1977).
111. See Fairman & Scott, supra note 17, at 1200 (footnotes omitted) ("[The Atomic
Energy Act Amendments] expanded and strengthened the nuclear plant licensing role of
the attorney general ... to such an extent that a general revision of the utilities' policies
vis-a-vis small systems is being compelled by the government.")




By the end of 1978, 72 of the 100 largest utilities had undergone anti-
trust review in the course of the nuclear licensing process.113
Despite these impressive statistics, prelicensing review is at best a
partial solution to the coordination problem. One shortcoming is that
the alleged victims of anticompetitive conduct can be excluded from
negotiations between the applicant and the Justice Department. The
agreements that emerge from bilateral negotiations sometimes bear the
hallmarks of ex parte advocacy." 4 Moreover, the scope of prelicensing
review extends only to activities conducted under a nuclear power
plant license that "would create or maintain a situation inconsistent
with the antitrust laws."' 15 The NRC has nothing to say about coor-
dination between firms that are not direct competitors or about refusals
to coordinate that do not raise antitrust problems. Finally, the pre-
licensing review process shares the defects of the regulatory solutions
discussed above, in that it seeks to extract services from a reluctant
monopolist without changing the incentives that discourage voluntary
coordination. 110 The need for close cooperation between coordinating
partners cannot easily be reconciled with a policy that attempts to
impose coordination by fiat.
113. [1978] NRC ANN. REP. 54.
114. In 1976 the Antitrust Division reached agreement with the Pacific Gas & Electric
Co. (PG&E) on a Statement of Commitments to be incorporated into the license for the
Stanislaus nuclear power plant. The Antitrust Division recommended against holding a
hearing, in the stated belief that the Commitments "will obviate the antitrust problems
posed by PG&E's activities." Letter from Assistant Attorney General Thomas E. Kauper
to Howard K. Shapar, Executive Legal Director, NRC (May 5, 1976) (on file with Yale
Law Journal). The Northern California Power Agency (NCPA), a coalition of publicly
owned distributors operating in the same area as PG&E, protested that the Stanislaus
Commitments were inadequate. But the Justice Department excluded NCPA from
negotiations with PG&-E over the terms of the commitments. Letter from George Spiegel
to Joseph J. Saunders, at 5 (Apr. 4, 1977), reprinted in National Energy Act Hearings,
supra note 21, pt. 3, at 560. Subsequently the NRC licensing board agreed that the
Stanislaus Commitments would not force PG&E to coordinate with municipal systems in
its service area. The Licensing Board rejected the recommendation of the Justice Depart-
ment and scheduled an antitrust hearing, which had reached the discovery stage at the
end of 1978. [1978] NRC ANN. REP. 55.
115. 42 U.S.C. § 2135(c)(5) (1976). A House subcommittee held hearings in 1977 on
several bills that would have created a prelicensing antitrust review program, ad-
ministered by the FPC, for new bulk-power facilities other than nuclear plants. See H.R.
6660, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. § 105 (1977); H.R. 6831, 95th Cong., Ist Sess. § 101 (1977).
Assistant Attorney General John H. Shenefield testified in favor of this legislation, noting
that "the relief available under section 105c [of the Atomic Energy Act] is inapplicable
to electric systems that choose not to construct nuclear generating units." National
Energy Act Hearings, supra note 21, pt. 3, at 591.
116. One manifestation of reluctance on the part of a carrier to coordinate with a
captive distributor might be a refusal to negotiate in good faith. NCPA has made allega-
tions of this nature against PG&E. See, e.g., Letter from George Spiegel to Joseph J.
Saunders, supra note 114. On June 28, 1978 the NRC sent a Notice of Violation to
Cleveland Electric Illuminating Co. that alleged noncompliance with antitrust conditions
attached to the permits for several of its plants. [1978] NRC ANN. REP. 55.
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II. The Need for Competition
A number of critics contend that the only way to obtain the full
economies of scale in system size is to consolidate all of the bulk-power
producers in a region, merging firms until each controls the optimum
amount of generating capacity. 117 Those who espouse this position
point to the management problems that beset power pools as proof
that concentration of ownership under one management is inherently
more efficient than compacts between autonomous firms." 8 Indeed
both common sense and the available evidence tend to support this
view."19 In a holding company such as the American Electric Power
Company, the interests of subsidiaries must bow to the priorities of the
entire system, and a decision affecting several operating companies
needs to be approved by only one board of directors.
Nevertheless, the Justice Department and many private experts op-
pose consolidation of the industry.120 The problem is that the control
by one firm of all generating plants and transmission lines in a region
would destroy any possibility of competition at the production stage.'
2'
To the Justice Department and like-minded critics, that is too high a
price to pay for the efficiency gains that could be secured through
wholesale merger.
117. E.g., FoRms, July 15, 1970, at 26 (quoting utility executive) (" '[Tihe truth is, you
can't have the one system concept unless you have one system.' "); see Cook, Coordination
and the Small Electric Power System, PuB. UTIL. FoRT., Nov. 23, 1967, at 24 (recommending
consolidation of nation's utilities into 12 to 15 vertically integrated firms); Miller, A
Needed Reform of the Organization and Regulation of the Interstate Electric Power
Industry, 38 FORDHAM L. Rav. 635, 664 (1970) (proposing transfer of all bulk-power
facilities to regional corporations); Zinder, supra note 41, at 16 (recommending operation
of all bulk-power facilities in New England by one public agency).
118. See, e.g., Zinder, supra note 41, at 62-67 (citing administrative obstacles to efficient
operation of power pool involving all New England utilities).
119. Breyer and MacAvoy note a positive correlation between the degree of coordina-
tion in a given bulk-power supply system and the size of the generating plants that it
installs. A fully integrated holding company is likely to build larger plants, with greater
scale economies, than a power pool of the same size. S. BREYER & P. MAcAvoy, supra
note 16, at 105 n.32.
120. See, e.g., Competitive Aspects of the Energy Industry: Hearings Before the Sub-
comm. on Antitrust and Monopoly of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 91st Cong., 2d
Sess., pt. 1, at 137 (1970) (statement of 'Walter B. Comegys, Deputy Assistant Attorney
General) ("Our view of the matter is that the suggested economies of scale can be ob-
tained by means other than merger."); Meeks, supra note 19, at 115. One study speculates
that mixed ownership pools may be able to match the planning and operating efficiency
of holding companies. R. Marritz & G. Culp, supra note 42, at 4. But see note 119 supra.
121. It would also reduce competition for the distribution franchise, if the monopoly
bulk-power supplier were permitted to retain its distribution subsidiaries. If policymakers
turn to consolidation as the best strategy to achieve scale economies, surviving bulk-power
suppliers should be divested of their distribution subsidiaries. Divestiture would reduce
the anticompetitive effects of consolidation by preserving the opportunity for rivalry
between prospective distribution franchisees. Since vertical integration confers no signif-
icant efficiency benefits, see note 67 supra, its prohibition is preferable to the merger of
all the utilities in a region into one vertically integrated holding company.
1534
Vol. 88: 1511, 1979
Electric Power
Traditional public-utility economics teaches that competition has no
place in a fully regulated industry such as electric power. 122 The more
widely accepted view today is that public policy should promote com-
petition in regulated industries, except where competition would
seriously interfere with the realization of scale economies.'2- 3 Those who
want to protect competition in electric power observe that the goal of
rate regulation in a monopolistic industry is to duplicate the results
that would occur under competition, if that were feasible. 124 But regu-
lation by the FERC and the states is a feeble surrogate for the cost-
cutting, performance-maximizing functions of competition. 25
122. The exponents of this viewpoint include Justice Stewart, who dissented from the
application of antitrust principles to an investor-owned utility in the Otter Tail case:
The very reason for the regulation of private utility rates-by state bodies and by
the Commission-is the inevitability of a monopoly that requires price control to take
the place of price competition. Antitrust principles applicable to other industries
cannot be blindly applied to a unilateral refusal to deal on the part of a power
company, operating in a regime of rate regulation and licensed monopolies.
Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366, 389 (1973) (Stewart, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part).
123. The idea that antitrust principles should complement regulation wherever
feasible commands broad support in the courts, in the agencies, and in academia. The
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia in 1968 embraced a "theory
of complementary regulation," and noted that "if competition exists, albeit in a limited
area, there would be incentives for innovation by the regulated companies themselves
and for their coming forward with proposals for better services, lower prices, or both."
Northern Natural Gas Co. v. FPC, 399 F.2d 953, 959, 964-65 (D.C. Cir. 1968). The
Supreme Court applied antitrust principles to regulated electric utilities in FPC v. Con-
way Corp., 426 U.S. 271, 278-79 (1976), Gulf States Utils. Co. v. FPC, 411 U.S. 747, 757-59
(1973), and Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366, 372-74 (1973). In Central
Power & Light Co. v. FERC, 575 F.2d 937 (D.C. Cir. 1978), the court suggested that the
FERC should consider possible antitrust violations by an electric utility in deciding
whether to exercise jurisdiction over that firm, when the exercise of jurisdiction is dis-
cretionary, id. at 938. Justice Department officials have testified in favor of legislation that
would enhance competition between utilities. See National Energy Act Hearings, supra
note 21, pt. '3, at 590 (statement of Assistant Attorney General John H. Shenefield). The
Antitrust Division has also intervened in SEC proceedings to oppose horizontal mergers
involving large utilities. See Weiss, supra note 12, at 165-66 (citing examples). The FERC
has been criticized, see note 98 supra, for overlooking alleged antitrust violations by
regulated firms, but at least in recent cases, FERC staff witnesses have emphasized the
desirability of competition in the industry, see, e.g., Taylor, supra note 9, at 19-21.
124. E.g., 1 A. KAHN, supra note 9, at 17.
125. See Taylor, supra note 9, at 20:
[R]egulation does not create the positive pressures for good performance similar
to those of competition. Regulation is essentially negative because it: sets maximum
prices and does not put pressure downwards on prices; establishes minimum standards
of service instead of encouraging better quality; and oversees expenditures rather than
letting market returns cull out good from poor investments.
These problems trouble regulated industries, even when the quality of regulation is very
high. Breyer and MacAvoy, in their study of the FPC, concluded that the Commission has
not been a very effective or forceful proponent of coordination. Moreover, the ability of
utilities to shift costs to retail sales (over which the Commission has no jurisdiction)
makes federal ratemaking ineffective as well. See S. BREYER & P. MAcAvoY, supra note 16,
at 15, 118-19.
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In a competitive market the price of a commodity responds quickly
to changes in the cost of production. By contrast, it may take a public
utility commission several years to authorize the "pass through" of
production-cost increases into wholesale or retail rate schedules.126 In
times of rapid inflation, when rising costs cut into profit margins that
were set on the basis of historic cost data, utility investors may not be
able to earn the rate of return authorized by the commission. 27 Until
rate relief is granted the utility may face great difficulty in raising the
capital required to build new generating plants. 28 If earnings do not
attract sufficient capital to meet increasing demand, the reliability of
the power supply may suffer.' 29 Firms in a competitive industry do not
face this problem.
Competition also forces firms to pursue new technologies; 130 regula-
tion, by contrast, sets minimum standards of performance. If one views
the nation's bulk-power supply system as a static resource, this differ-
ence may not seem very significant, particularly when monopoly
facilitates central dispatching and other coordination measures. But
126. According to the Edison Electric Institute, the "regulatory lag" between the date
when a utility requested a rate increase and the date when a state regulatory commission
put the new rates into effect averaged 10.8 months in early 1979. Dodash, Electric Utilities,
Hit By Cost of Money, Rate-Increase Delays, See Lackluster Year, Wall St. J., Mar. 22,
1979, at 48, col. 1. Regulatory commissions set rates on the basis of the cost of doing
business during a historic or projected "test year." See 1 A. KAHN, supra note 9, at 26. If
the commission uses a historic cost standard, as many do, the new rates may be in-
adequate by the time they take effect. See Dodash, supra. Moreover, the commission may
grant the utility much less than the requested increase. The political pressure to hold
the line on rate increases is strongest, of course, during inflationary periods when the
operating and capital costs of the utility are escalating.
127. In 1976, for instance, the nation's top 50 electric utilities earned roughly 11.7%
on equity, compared with an average allowed rate of return of roughly 13.1%. Public
Utility Hearings, supra note 19, pt. 2, at 8 (statement of Frederick B. Whittemore, Man-
aging Director, Morgan Stanley & Co.).
128. The combination of rising interest rates and the effect of OPEC on fossil-fuel
prices threw much of the electric-power industry into a financial tailspin. The 1974-75
period was characterized by "almost weekly announcements of cut construction pro-
grams." Id. In Michigan the two investor-owned utilities that served 90% of the
state's electric-power needs suffered such a shrinkage in earnings that their bonds were
derated and common stock prices fell below par value. Governor's Advisory Commission
on Electric Power Alternatives, State of Michigan, Final Report 4 (1976) [hereinafter cited
as Advisory Commission]. By 1974 the two biggest electric utilities in Michigan found
themselves "virtually unable to finance further expansion." Id.
129. The adverse financial conditions of 1974-75 forced the two major utilities in
Michigan to cancel or defer the construction of 12,002 MW of generating capacity. Ad-
visory Commission, supra note 128, at 6. The Michigan Public Service Commission
predicted that if demand for electric power grew at predicted rates, southeast Michigan
would face "the near certainty of extensive power black-outs" by 1979. Id. Fortunately
the black-outs did not materialize, in part because the rate of growth in demand for
electric power since 1974 has fallen off the pre-OPEC pace. See note 131 infra.
130. Taylor, supra note 9, at 16 ("Competition applies continuous pressure on firms
to achieve the lowest costs and prices and to improve the quality of their products. In
order to compete successfully firms must pursue technological innovations.")
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conditions in the electric-power industry are far from static. Bulk-
power suppliers operate in an environment of constantly growing
demand,1 3 ' incessant technological innovation, unstable input prices,
and shifting regulatory requirements. In this environment the effi-
ciency of any firm depends on the speed with which it responds to
changing market conditions.
The lethargy with which leading utilities have moved to exploit new
generating technologies clearly illustrates the stifling effect of regula-
tion on the pace of innovation in the electric-power industry. A major
aim of United States energy policy is to reduce our dependence on
foreign oil by accelerating the development of promising new domestic
energy sources. 132 Cogeneration, 33 for instance, already contributes
substantially to the energy budgets of many European countries.1 34
Higher fossil-fuel prices abroad partially explain the greater success of
the Europeans in harnessing this promising energy source. Another
factor is the low prices that United States utilities have been willing
to pay industrial generators for their surplus generation. 35 Regulated
utilities show little interest in purchasing energy from an industrial
131. Between 1963 and 1973 the total sales of electricity by utilities more than doubled.
EDISON ELECTRIC INSTITUTE, supra note 27, at 31. Growth in demand fell off sharply
following the Arab Oil Embargo of 1973, but it has since resumed at the more modest
rate of 3.5% annually. Wall St. J., Feb. 7, 1979, at 42, col. 1. At this rate demand would
double every 20 years. The more likely scenario, however, is a gradual resurgence to an
annual rate of 5-6% over the next decade. S. REP. No. 442, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1977).
132. See EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, THE NATIONAL ENERGY PLAN xiii (1977).
133. Cogeneration is the production of electricity from industrial-process steam, before
or after it has performed its function in the factory. Industrial furnaces and boilers
produce substantial quantities of unharnessed heat, which can be forced through a
turbine rather than vented into the atmosphere. Because the heat performs a double
function, cogeneration is an exceptionally fuel-efficient method of producing electricity.
See generally National Energy Act Hearings, supra note 21, pt. 3, at 346-54 (statement of
George N. Hatsopoulos).
134. Cogeneration produces about 29% of the electricity consumed in West Germany,
compared with 4% in the United States. States Rights, Moratoria, and NRC Licensing
Reform: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Energy and the Environment of the House
Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 246 (1977) (state-
ment of Rep. Fish) [hereinafter cited as States Rights Hearings].
135. For example, until 1976 PG&E purchased economy energy from a Georgia-Pacific
pulp mill in Fort Bragg, California at a price of 2.5 mills/k',Vh. Letter from George Spiegel
to Joseph J. Saunders, supra note 114. In 1976 Georgia-Pacific negotiated with PG&E in
an attempt to obtain a higher price. When these negotiations proved fruitless, Georgia-
Pacific agreed to sell the energy to NCPA for a price of 7.5 mills. Id. The only problem
was that the parties needed PG&E's wheeling services to transmit the electricity 35 miles
from Fort Bragg to the NCPA member city of Ukiah. The investor-owned system
declined to provide this service because it preferred to keep Ukiah as a captive wholesale
customer. Id. Instead, under threat of antitrust action, PG&E raised its offering price for
Georgia-Pacific power to between 14 and 20 mills. Letter from Terry J. Houlihan (PG&E
counsel) to Joseph J. Saunders, at 4 (Apr. 21, 1977), reprinted in National Energy Act
Hearings, supra note 21, Pt. 3, at 565. This was still below the incremental cost of
generation for the investor-owned system. Id.
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cogenerator or any other producer, in part because purchased energy
contributes nothing to the rate base on which the firm earns revenue.1 36
Furthermore, the integrated producer may refuse to wheel power
produced by an industrial cogenerator in order to prevent the market-
ing of that power in competition with its own output.137
The dearth of effective competition at the production stage, enforced
by transmission restrictions, depresses the price of "alternative" energy.
As a result, incentives for industry to develop generating resources are
reduced and potential sources of low-cost power remain undeveloped. 138
The consolidation of all regional bulk-power facilities would only
exacerbate the problem, by further reducing the number of potential
buyers in the bulk-power services market.
III. A Proposal for a More Efficient Electric-Power Industry
A. Regional Dispatching Corporations
The proponents of consolidation assume that the full exploitation
of scale economies requires the ownership by one firm of all the gen-
136. In a letter to the Antitrust Division denying any anticompetitive motive for re-
fusing to wheel Georgia-Pacific power to NCPA, see note 135 supra, counsel for PG&E
pointed out: "PG and E as a corporation does not profit at all by the purchase of surplus
energy from Georgia-Pacific. Such a transaction does not affect PG and E's invested
capital and, therefore, does not increase the return allowed PG and E by the agencies
regulating its rates." Letter from Terry J. Houlihan (PG&E counsel) to Joseph J. Saunders,
supra note 135, at 3.
137. See note 135 supra. In 1978 Congress acted to prevent utilities from blocking the
development of cogeneration by refusing to purchase or wheel electricity produced by
industrial customers. The Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978 requires utilities
to offer to purchase electricity from qualifying cogeneration facilities and small power
producers, at rates that do not discriminate against such producers. Pub. L. No. 95-617,
§ 210, 92 Stat. 3117 (1978) (codified at 16 U.S.C.A. § 824a-3 (-West Supp. 1979)). The Act
also gives the FERC authority to order the interconnection of a cogeneration facility or
small-power producer with any electric utility, subject to the same conditions that govern
any interconnection order. 16 U.S.C.A. § 824i (West Supp. 1979). Presumably an electric
utility may also petition the FERC to order another utility to wheel power from a
cogeneration facility to the applicant. Id. § 824j(a). But many potential applicants (in-
cluding NCPA) will not be able to take advantage of this provision, since the transaction
would disturb "existing competitive relationships." Id. § 824j(c)(1); see note 84 supra
(discussing other restrictions on FERC wheeling authority). The impact of the 1978
amendments on cogeneration development will depend in part on the rules that the
FERC will issue to govern transactions between utilities and cogenerators. It is easy to
imagine a situation in which the cost of securing a purchase or wheeling commitment
from a reluctant utility would be prohibitive for a small industrial producer whose prin-
cipal business is not the generation of electricity.
138. Georgia-Pacific told NCPA that at the rates PG&E was paying for economy
energy, Georgia-Pacific could not even maintain its existing cogeneration facility. If,
however, some purchaser offered a fair and reasonable price, more power could be
produced. Brief of Intervenor Northern California Power Agency at 8, Pacific Gas & Elec.
Co., No. 76-NOI-3 (Cal. Energy Resources Conservation & Dev. Comm'n, Oct. 21, 1977)
(quoting testimony of Richard L. Hughes, Mayor, Lodi, Cal.).
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erating capacity in a region.13 0 If this premise were correct, the merger
schemes mentioned above might be the best solution to the efficiency
problem. But the assumption of an inherent conflict between the goals
of competition and coordination appears to be wrong; the organiza-
tional structure of the industry creates the conflict. By reassigning
certain functions currently performed by integrated utilities, Congress
could simultaneously improve the efficiency of the bulk-power supply
and create new opportunities for competition in production and dis-
tribution of electricity.
Congress should enact legislation to provide for the chartering of
regional bulk-power dispatching corporations. Each such corporation
would be directed to acquire all of the high-voltage transmission
capacity within its region, to lease generating plants from producers,
and to dispatch electricity for resale to independent distribution com-
panies. Utilities would continue to own generating plants and/or
distribution systems, but the authority to dispatch bulk-power facilities,
to transmit electricity at high voltage, and to sell bulk power at whole-
sale would be vested exclusively in the Regional Dispatching Corpora-
tion (RDC).
RDCs would lease generating plants from the low bidders in the
region. Leases would run for a limited term of years, with the maxi-
mum term to be specified in the statute. 140 RDCs would have full
discretion in deciding what mix of bulk-power services would most
efficiently meet the needs of the region,14' but the lease for a specified
type of service would go, by law, to the low bidder. RDCs would not
be permitted to include leased generating plants in their rate bases.
Annual charges for the lease of production capacity would be passed
through to consumers as operating expenses.'
42
139. See p. 1534 supra.
140. Setting the maximum term for a lease of generating equipment involves a delicate
act of legislative balancing. Too long a term would defeat a primary objective of com-
petition, which is to encourage innovation and the replacement of obsolete equipment.
But if the lease is too short, investors will view electric-power production as an exceed-
ingly risky business, an assessment that will be reflected in the cost of capital for gen-
erating plants. The proposal advanced here seeks to shift part of the risk of technological
obsolescence from the customers to the investors. The length of the lease would dictate
the tradeoff between efficiency and investor protection.
141. Different types of generating units serve different functions. A plant that is used
for only a few hours a day to meet peak-period demand will be less capital intensive and
more expensive to operate than a "baseload" unit that runs 24 hours a day. See National
Energy Act Hearings, supra note 21, pt. 3, at 86-87 (statement of David J. Bardin,
Deputy Administrator, FEA). RDCs would solicit bids for a plant to operate X hours per
day, depending on the load curve of the region. Producers would have the task of decid-
ing what equipment would most efficiently provide the specified service.
142. This provision is included to insulate RDCs from any possible Averch-Johnson
incentive to favor capital-intensive generating technologies. The exclusion of leased pro-
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Having leased the units, the RDC would dispatch them in a fully
coordinated manner. The enabling legislation would direct each RDC
to function on central economic dispatching principles, except when
strict adherence to the least-cost rule would be detrimental to public
health or welfare.
143
The structure of the distribution stage would not change at all.
Distribution companies would continue to compete at the state or
local level for the franchise to serve a given area. However, they would
purchase their full bulk-power requirements from the RDC, at a price
that would cover the distributor's pro rata share of the capital and
operating expenses of the RDC. In contrast to conditions under the
present regulatory regime,14 4 all distributors within a region would
pay the same rates for bulk power.
Each RDC would be an investor-owned corporation, run by share-
holders for their own benefit, subject to certain statutory restrictions.
Diversification would be forbidden, and RDCs would be required to
serve all distributors in the region. Stockholders would elect a majority
of the board of directors. The rest would be appointed by the Secretary
of Energy. Congress could model the corporate structure of an RDC
after that of other federal-private hybrids, such as the Communications
Satellite Corporation.' 45
RDCs would face a formidable challenge in raising sufficient capital
to purchase or condemn all high-voltage transmission equipment, to
finance future improvements, and to lease generating equipment. One
solution to this problem would be for the statute to provide that RDCs
could issue their own securities in exchange for property purchased
duction equipment from the RDCs' rate base need not harm its investors. The return on
each dollar invested is an arithmetic product of the rate base times the percentage rate
of return. The latter figure can be adjusted to compensate for the exclusion of certain
assets from the rate base. See 1 A. KAHN, supra note 9, at 36.
143. For instance, RDCs would minimize the use of coal-fired generating plants during
a smog episode, even though coal might be the most economical fuel available. Similarly,
an RDC could alter its dispatching criteria during a fuel shortage. The late Senator Lee
Metcalf incorporated an escape clause of this kind into his proposal for a national power
grid. The National Power Grid Corporation would have been authorized to sell electric
power at rates "which shall be set at the lowest possible level consistent with sound
business principles and ... environmental protection requirements." S. 1208, 94th Cong.,
1st Sess., § 102(c)(1) (1975).
144. See p. 1544 infra (large disparities in retail electric rates between neighboring
communities).
145. The Communications Satellite Act of 1962, 47 U.S.C. §§ 701-744 (1970), created a
private corporation to develop a global communications-satellite system. ComSat issues its
own securities, id. § 734, and is chartered as a District of Columbia corporation, id. § 731.
The President appoints three members of the board of directors, and the other 12 are
elected by the stockholders. Id. § 733(a).
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from utilities. 140 The securities of an RDC would be a low-risk invest-
ment, for the RDC would command a dependable source of earnings
from the sale of bulk power. Utilities dissatisfied with the offering
price for their property would have appraisal rights, as in any con-
demnation proceeding.
Each RDC would enjoy a monopoly over transmission in its region.
The sacrifice of competition at the transmission stage is a necessary
concession to the physical properties of electric power, which make
transmission a natural monopoly. 147 Thus, that part of the industry
would continue to require rate regulation, but the present allocation of
ratemaking responsibility between the FERC and the states would be
modified. Under the Federal Power Act, FERC ratemaking jurisdiction
extends only to wholesale transactions in interstate commerce. 148 Thus,
if a vertically integrated utility sells ninety percent of the electricity it
produces to its own retail customers and the other ten percent to a
utility in another state, at least two regulatory bodies will have juris-
diction over rates for the sale of power produced by one set of gen-
erating plants. All sales by RDCs, however, would fall within the
exclusive domain of the FERC, as presently defined. 49 State commis-
sions would retain jurisdiction over retail rates.' -0
RDCs would assume the bulk-power marketing functions presently
performed by the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA), the Bonneville
Power Administration (BPA), the Western Area Power Administration,
the Southeastern Power Administration, the Southwestern Power Ad-
146. The plan proposed here would require less new capital than certain of the merger
schemes mentioned in note 117 supra, which contemplate the takeover by one corporation
of all bulk-power facilities in a region. John T. Miller, Jr., an advocate of the latter ap-
proach, suggested that regional bulk-power corporations could pay part of the cost of
acquired facilities by the roll-over of the debt of the transferring firm. See Miller, supra
note 117, at 664.
147. See note 11 supra.
148. 16 U.S.C.A. § 824(b)(1) (West Supp. 1979).
149. Each RDC would operate like a large interstate power pool, and would sell bulk
power at wholesale to local distributors. Some of this energy might come from generating
plants located in the same state as the purchasing distributor, but so long as plants in
several states contributed to a fully integrated interstate system, the FERC would have
ratemaking jurisdiction. See Arkansas Power & Light Co. v. FPC, 368 F.2d 376, 379 (8th
Cir. 1966); Indiana & Mich. Elec. Co. v. FPC, 365 F.2d 180, 184 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
385 U.S. 972 (1966). Federal jurisdiction over sales for resale precludes concurrent state
jurisdiction. See FPC v. Southern Cal. Edison Co., 376 U.S. 205, 215 (1964) (citing United
States v. Public Utils. Comm'n, 345 U.S. 295, 311 (1953)).
150. State regulators would be expected to pass on to retail customers the wholesale
rates approved by the FERC. Indeed, assuming that the FERC did a reasonably con-
scientious job in investigating the comparatively few RDC tariffs tendered for approval,
there would be no point in allowing state commissions to relitigate wholesale rate issues,
with a resultant increase in regulatory lag. Congress might consider requiring states auto-
matically to pass through wholesale rates approved by the FERC.
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ministration, and the Alaska Power Administration.5 1 These agencies
presently sell bulk power'5 2 to publicly owned distribution systems,
private power companies, and large industrial customers. 153 Under the
proposed plan, all federal generating capacity would be leased to the
appropriate RDC, on the same terms as privately owned capacity.
Federal transmission lines would be sold to the RDCs.
Econometric analysis would be required to determine how many
dispatching regions should be created and where to draw boundaries.
The FPC's 1964 National Power Survey estimated the savings from
full coordination of all utilities in a region, for regions of differing
sizes. 54 Specifically, it projected the additional benefits of moving from
sixteen to eight regions and from eight to a single nationwide dis-
patching system. But the Survey made certain questionable assumptions
about the benefits of increased coordination, and it overlooked some
of the costs.155 An intensive reexamination of the cost-benefit equation
for systems of varying size would be needed to estimate the point at
which incremental transmission and managerial costs exceed incre-
mental gains from coordination-the key tradeoff in determining the
optimum size for an RDC.'1 6
151. For capsule sketches of these agencies and their operations, see Pun. POWER, Jan.-
Feb. 1978, at 102.
152. The power comes from hydroelectric projects constructed by the Army Corps of
Engineers and the Bureau of Reclamation. Id. TVA also owns some thermal plants. Id.
TVA is the only federal agency authorized to develop electric power from sources other
than water power. Fairman & Scott, supra note 17, at 1183 n.108.
153. Publicly owned utilities, principally municipal distributors and rural electric
cooperatives, enjoy a statutory preference to purchase the power sold by federal agencies.
See Fairman & Scott, supra note 17, at 1183. As a result of this preference, more than 60%
of TVA's 1977 output went to 110 municipal systems and 50 coops. PUB. POWER, Jan.-Feb.
1978, at 102. TVA and BPA also serve a few large industrial customers. They are the
only federal entities that distribute any power to ultimate consumers. Public Utility
Hearings, supra note 19, pt. 2, at 422 (statement of Abraham Gerber and Joe D. Pace).
154. The Survey stated that additional coordination would yield all of the benefits
described at pp. 1514-17 supra. See 1964 POWER SURVEY, supra note 10, at 170-73. For two
types of coordination, diversity exchange and reserve sharing, the Survey presented
quantitative projections of the savings, in reduced capacity requirements, from full
coordination of all the utilities in regions of varying size, including one national power
system. See id. at 183 (Table 49); id. at 197 (Table 53).
155. See the critique in S. BREYER & P. MACAVOY, sukra note 16, at 95-96.
156. See Public Utility Hearings, supra note 19, pt. 2, at 404 (statement of Abraham
Gerber and Joe D. Pace):
Interconnections and pools are not costless. They involve large expenditures for
physical facilities and these expenditures increase as the number and variety of
functions expand, the number of participants increases and the complexity and
sophistication of the coordination grows. In addition, the costs of administration,
information exchange, engineering and other technical expertise dedicated to the in-
terconnection arrangement also are substantial and increase as the degree of coordina-
tion increases. In each case, each participant must determine that the benefits in
reliability and economy of power supply are sufficient to compensate it for the in-
currence of these costs.
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B. Benefits of the Proposal
The reorganization scheme outlined here compares favorably with
both the status quo and the reform proposals discussed above. First, it
creates regional bulk-power systems large enough to capture all feasible
economies of scale. Unlike the management committee of a power
pool, each RDC would exercise unfettered control over the dispatching
of the bulk-power supply in its region. Operating decisions would no
longer require the unanimous consent of ten divergent interests, or the
accommodation of those interests at the expense of efficiency'157 By
virtue of their size, RDCs would also be able to install high-capacity
transmission lines, and to contract for new generating capacity in incre-
ments large enough to stimulate the construction of large-scale plants.
In terms of access to scale economies, the proposed plan promises
the same result as regional consolidation schemes discussed above,
15s
but it achieves that result while preserving a measure of competition
at the production stage of the industry. Like distributors under the
present regime, producers would have to compete for the franchise to
serve-in this case for the contract to lease generating capacity. Ad-
mittedly, this is an attenuated form of competition. It covers only the
capital cost of production facilities, not the operating cost of running a
generating plant. But, depending upon the length of the leases awarded
to producers, the limited competition envisioned here could have
several salutary effects.
First, it would act as a spur to innovation. As noted above,' 50 regula-
tion gives producers few incentives to develop new technologies, par-
ticularly when the energy comes from facilities that cannot be added
to the rate base of the utility. Under the proposed scheme nothing
would prevent the developer of a low-cost energy source from out-
bidding the competition. An RDG, with a rate base consisting entirely
of transmission and dispatching equipment, would earn no profit on
the resale of bulk power. Therefore it would have no reason to dis-
criminate against any producer; it would look only to the criterion
embedded in the statute-the cost of the capacity. In particular, RDCs
would have no bias against leasing capacity from outside the electric
industry. This would stimulate the emergence of technologies, like
cogeneration and wind power, for which integrated utilities have shown
little enthusiasm. 160
157. Decisionmaking by committee and its adverse impact on efficiency are discussed
at p. 1519 supra.
158. See note 117 supra.
159. See note 125 supra.
160. In 1977 the Consolidated Edison Company of New York flatly refused to purchase
economy energy from a rooftop windmill in Manhattan. The utility said that power
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Competition to produce power at the lowest cost would curb any
tendency on the part of producers to undertake unnecessary capital in-
vestments. To the extent that the Averch-Johnson theory is correct,
RDCs would still face an incentive to overinvest in the regional
transmission grid, since cost-of-service regulation would continue at the
transmission stage. But the distortion would no longer influence in-
vestment strategy at the production stage, which accounted for seventy
percent of construction expenditures by utilities in 1977.11
In addition to promoting competition among producers, the plan
advocated here would increase the vigor of competition at the distribu-
tion stage. Under present conditions competition for the distribution
franchise in many areas is curtailed by the inability of potential en-
trants to secure a low-cost source of bulk power. 16 2 Small firms cannot
economically produce their own electricity, and vertically integrated
rivals control access to external suppliers. Independent distributors
facing anticompetitive refusals to wheel or coordinate lack an effective
legal remedy.
RDCs, however, would deal with all distributors on an equal foot-
ing. Any firm holding a distribution franchise would have access to the
only source of bulk power in the region, on the same terms as every
other distributor in the region. Having no production or distribution
affiliates, the RDC would face no temptation to protect incumbent
franchisees from competition. The guarantee of equal treatment to all
distributors would remove a formidable barrier to market entry at the
distribution stage.
The equalization of bulk-power rates across each region would also
eliminate one of the more glaring inequities in the existing regulatory
regime. Throughout the United States retail rates for electricity vary
from one community to another, simply because different distributors
have access to more- or less-expensive sources of bulk power. 6 3 These
local variations in wholesale rates disguise the relative efficiency of
surges from the two kWh windmill might damage its 10-million kwh system. Eventually
the New York Public Service Commission ordered Con Ed to buy any excess energy
produced by the windmill. N.Y. Times, May 6, 1977, § A, at 1, col. 1.
161. EDISON ELETRIC INSTITUTE, supra note 27, at 59.
162. See, e.g., Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366, 370-71 (1973).
163. A good example of this phenomenon is the disparity in retail rates paid by
customers of public and private utilities in the Pacific Northwest. The publicly owned
distribution system in Vancouver, Washington buys its bulk power from the Bonneville
Power Authority, and charges retail customers $10 for the first 1,000 kwh. Across the
river in Portland, Oregon, homeowners pay $27 for the same amount of electricity, which
is produced by an investor-owned utility. Pacific Northwest Electric Power Supply and
Conservation: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Water and Power Resources of the
House Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 3, at 4 (state-
ment of Oregon Governor Robert Straub).
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neighboring distributors by giving one firm a substantial head start
over its neighbor. They may also lead energy-intensive industries to
choose new plant sites for reasons that have nothing to do with the
natural advantages of a particular location. RDCs would abolish these
capricious disparities by charging the same rates for bulk power
throughout the region.
The final benefit of the suggested reorganization is that it would
impose a uniform set of ratemaking rules on all bulk-power transac-
tions. Fifty years ago technological constraints on the long-distance
transmission of electricity severely limited the size of the area that could
be served by any one utility. Today systems like the American Electric
Power Company and the New England Power Pool operate in five or
six states. The size of the regulatory unit has not been adjusted to
match this evolution in technology. As a result, interstate ventures are
hindered by costly, redundant, and occasionally conflicting state
rules.0 4 Utilities may forego a coordination initiative that involves
regulation by several commissions, each of which imposes different
accounting and cost-recovery rules.16 5
The regulatory crazy-quilt hampers coordination efforts, and the
problem will grow in severity as bulk-power supply systems continue
164. The rules governing issues such as what items may be included in the rate base,
methods of depreciation, and the treatment of operating expenses vary from state to
state. See STRUCTURAL REFORM, supra note 33, at 68. When a bulk-power facility serves
customers in more than one state the utility may have to present the same rate case in
two different formats, at different times, and very possibly with differing results. "Al-
though nearly half of all investor-owned utility generating capacity is owned by com-
panies which operate in more than one state, commissions of adjoining states almost never
meet jointly, and federal/state initiatives to seek improved regulation of interstate bulk
power matters have been negligible." R. Marritz & G. Culp, supra note 42, at 37.
165. A 1972 FPC study concluded that interconnection of Texas utilities with those in
surrounding states would save the Texas firms $156 million at 1972 prices. Federal Power
Commission, Study of proposed interconnection between Electric Reliability Council of
Texas and Southwest Power Pool 18 (1972), cited in SENATE COMM. ON INTERIOR AND
INSULAR AFFAIRs, 94TH CONG., 2D SEss., NATIONAL POWER GRID SYSTEM STUDY-AN OVERVIEw
OF ECONOMfIcs, REGULATORY, AND ENGINEERING ASPECTs 121 (Comm. Print 1976). Despite
the potential saving, Texas utilities refused to interconnect with firms in adjacent states.
The explanation for this conduct is that the absence of interstate ties enabled Texas
utilities to escape the jurisdiction of the FPC. Public Utility Hearings, supra note 19, pt.
3, at 40 (statement of S.B. Phillips, Jr.); id. at 140 (statement of David J. Bardin, Deputy
Administrator, FEA). Finally, in 1978, Congress decided to permit Texas utilities to gain
the benefits of interconnection without subjecting themselves to FERC ratemaking. The
Federal Power Act now provides that an order to interconnect, sell, exchange, or wheel
energy "shall not make an electric utility or other entity subject to the jurisdiction of
the Commission for any purposes other than" compliance with an order to interconnect,
sell, exchange, or wheel. 16 U.S.C.A. § 824(b)(2) (West Supp. 1979).
Immediately after the passage of the 1978 amendments the Texas utilities moved to
interconnect with firms in neighboring states. Telephone interview with Dr. Gordon T.C.
Taylor, Director, Division of Economics, Office of Regulatory Analysis, FERC (Apr. 18,
1979).
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to expand. Congress addressed the issue in 1978 by permitting the
FERC in certain circumstances to exempt utilities from state rules that
frustrate voluntary coordination.16 But the power to issue ad hoc
exemptions in certain areas does not meet the need for regional super-
vision of regional enterprises. The proposed scheme would insure the
desired uniformity by assigning jurisdiction over all bulk-power trans-
actions to the FERC, while preserving state regulation of essentially
local distribution systems.
Thus the scheme outlined above addresses most of the problems that
impair the efficiency of the electric-power industry. It would create
bulk-power supply systems of efficient size, introduce competition into
the most capital intensive phase of the industry, promote the develop-
ment of new generating technologies, and eliminate capricious local
disparities in rates and ratemaking rules.
C. Potential Problems
The plan also has several weaknesses. Under the current regime,
state laws require utilities to provide adequate service at all times.'0 7
States hold utilities responsible for pr6jecting future capacity require-
ments and generating or purchasing the necessary capacity. Utilities
have every incentive to err on the side of safety, both because capital
investments go into the rate base and because a power shortage can be
a social catastrophe.
Under the proposed regime, the responsibility for projection of fu-
ture demand would be vested in an RDC, which would have to rely
on producers to build the necessary facilities. Producers, however,
would face no sanctions for failure to build enough capacity. On the
contrary, the infusion of competition at the production stage would
penalize producers that overbuild. Nor would RDCs have any financial
incentive to lease capacity in excess of current needs. For these reasons
there is likely to be less "slack" in the bulk-power supply than at
present.
Nothing would prevent RDCs from setting future capacity targets
and soliciting bids to meet them. These targets could include generous
reserve margins. But the division of responsibility between RDCs and
producers would deprive the planning authority of the direct power to
carry out its own program. This bifurcation could conceivably affect
the reliability of the power supply.
166. See note 44 supra.
167. See, e.g., CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 451 (West 1975); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 16-10a
(Supp. 1979). See generally Meeks, supra note 19, at 69.
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A second problem involves a possible conflict between the competi-
tive orientation of the proposed regulatory plan and the licensing
requirements imposed by various state and federal statutes.0 8 Under
the plan, producers would bid for contracts to lease generating facilities.
At present the licensing and construction of a nuclear power plant takes
ten to fourteen years.'69 Given this lead period the RDCs would have
to solicit bids a decade or more before the new capacity was needed.
Producers would have to bid on the basis of the projected cost of build-
ing a new facility. The problem this poses is that utilities have little
control over some items in the capital budget for a new plant, such as
the cost of raw materials and the cost of meeting licensing require-
ments.' 70 Environmental and safety regulation imposes costs that are
almost unpredictable because they depend on factors such as the loca-
tion of the plant, and the political environment in the surrounding
community. Given the infeasibility of closely estimating regulatory
costs, no prudent firm would bind itself fifteen years in advance to
deliver capacity from a new plant at a specified price, without running
the regulatory gamut first. Yet only a foolhardy entrepreneur would
initiate the lengthy and expensive licensing process without an advance
purchasing commitment from an RDC.
A partial solution to this dilemma would be to expedite the licensing
process. In 1978, the Carter Administration proposed a streamlining of
the procedure for licensing nuclear power plants.' 7 ' This controver-
168. Large generating plants require a multitude of operating licenses and construc-
tion permits. The sponsor of the Seabrook nuclear power station reported having to
obtain more than 43 different permits from 17 federal, state, and local agencies. NEW
ENGLAND FEDERAL REGIONAL COUNCIL ENERGY RESOURCE DEVELOPMENT TASK FORCE BULK
POWER COMMIrTEE, A REPORT ON NUCLEAR POWER PLANT DELAYS IN NEW ENGLAND 21
(1976), reprinted in States Rights Hearings, supra note 134, pt. I, at 493. The subject
matter of the regulations is beyond the scope of this essay, but the point worth noting is
that many different authorities have the power to prolong the construction period and to
regulate the design or operation of the plant, in either case dramatically affecting the
cost of the facility. For a description of the regulatory framework and the cost of delay,
see A. MURPHY, THE LICENSING OF POWER PLANTS IN THE UNITED STATES (1978), reprinted
in Nuclear Siting and Licensing Act of 1978: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Energy
and the Environment of the House Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs, 95th Cong., 2d
Sess., pt. 3, at 361-472 (1978).
169. A. MURPHY, supra note 168, at 384-85. The lead time for coal-fired plants is
several years shorter, but Murphy notes "the fear that the length of the licensing process
for coal-fired plants will soon approach, or even match, that for nuclear." Id. at 371.
170. Antipollution equipment alone accounts for 15% of the capital cost of a new
generating plant. Dodash, supra note 126.
171. According to Energy Secretary James R. Schlesinger, the Administration's proposed
amendments to the Atomic Energy Act, S. 2775, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978); H.R. 11704,
95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978), would have reduced the interval between the decision to build
a nuclear plant and the receipt of an operating license to 6.5 years. CONG. Q. WEEKLY
REP., Mar. 25, 1978, at 745. A House subcommittee rejected the bill in 1978, but the
Administration was expected to resubmit the measure without major changes in the 96th
Congress. Id., Mar. 24, 1979, at 508.
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sial legislation would eliminate areas of overlap between state and
federal regulation, authorize the NRC to resolve safety issues com-
mon to all plants in one generic proceeding, and limit the participa-
tion of public interest intervenors. 172 By reducing the cost and un-
certainty attributable to regulatory delay173 the Administration bill
would enable producers to make more reliable cost estimates for a
nuclear project.
A more sweeping solution would be for RDCs to lease capacity from
new projects before they are licensed, and to reimburse the producer
for the cost of meeting regulatory requirements above some baseline
figure. The weakness of this solution is that it would create a class of
costs that are external to the bidding process. RDCs could expect to
see more offers to lease nuclear capacity (the most expensive to license)
than would be received if producers bore the entire cost of meeting
regulatory standards. Nevertheless, producers must have some means
of making reliable long-range projections of the cost of building gen-
erating plants; otherwise the vast amounts of capital needed to finance
them would not be forthcoming.
Moreover, insuring producers against unexpected regulatory burdens
would create an important external benefit as well as an external cost.
Today utilities sometimes choose between generating technologies be-
cause of comparative licensing advantages, even though the rejected
option might produce more economical electricity.174 On balance, the
advantages of minimizing licensing cost as a selection criterion would
far outweigh the incremental cost of licensing the most efficient set of
plants.
Conclusion
It is possible to restructure the electric-power industry in a way which
promotes both competition and coordination. The creation of regional
dispatching authorities that procure generating capacity through com-
172. See S. 2775, supra note 171; H.R. 11704, supra note 171. For a one-page summary
of the provisions of these bills, see CONG. Q. WEEKLY REP., Mar. 25, 1978, at 745.
173. The Commonwealth Edison Co. estimated the cost of one year's delay in the
licensing of an 1,100 MW nuclear plant (a medium-large unit) at ,$50 million, when the
delay occurs early and no replacement power needs to be purchased, and $200 million
when the delay occurs near the end of the construction process and the utility must
purchase power that would have been produced by the plant. A. MURPHY, supra note 168,
at 386.
174. The licensing advantages of coal over nuclear generation led one utility to
abandon nuclear power, even though on other grounds it preferred the nuclear option.
As one critic noted, "A more self-defeating impact of the regulatory process is hard to
imagine." Id. at 881.
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petitive bidding for resale to independent distributors would encourage
both the efficient utilization of existing bulk-power facilities and the
expeditious development of new technologies. In these ways the pro-
posed plan would promote the national energy goals first enunciated
by Congress in 1935: an abundant supply of electricity, delivered "with
the greatest possible economy and with regard to the proper utilization
and conservation of natural resources."'175
The proposal offered here is not without precedent. The argument
that a natural monopoly at one stage of a vertically integrated industry
does not preclude competition at every stage of the enterprise has been
applied to other pervasively regulated industries' 7 6 Electric power
presents a particularly difficult problem, due to the need for coor-
dinated management of production and transmission facilities. For
this reason the structural reform proposed in this paper deserves con-
sideration. It would inject a welcome dose of competition into the
national energy plan.
Matthew Cohen
175. Federal Power Act, § 202(a), 16 U.S.C. § 824a(a) (1976).
176. The issues in United States v. American Tel. 8: Tel. Co., No. 74-1698 (D.D.C.,
filed Nov. 20, 1974), closely resemble those discussed in this essay. The American Tele-
phone 9- Telegraph Co. (AT&T) is a vertically integrated holding company. Its Western
Electric and Bell Telephone Laboratories subsidiaries manufacture and develop telecom-
munications equipment. The Long Lines division provides long-distance circuits to con-
nect telephone exchanges in different areas. The local operating companies provide service
between customers connected to the same exchange. The government contends, inter alia,
that the local exchange franchises are bottleneck monopolies, the control of which AT&T
uses to foreclose market entry by competing equipment manufacturers and intercity
carriers. Plaintiff's First Statement of Contentions and Proof at 82-83, 625. AT&T
responds, inter alia, that considerations of efficiency and reliability support the vertical
extension of the local exchange monopoly to long lines and to the manufacture of
equipment. Defendants' First Statement of Contentions and Proof at 6-9.
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